Plan

Plan: The United States federal government should remove its sanctions on Cuba.

Advantage 1 is OFAC

Embargo overstretches OFAC now- plan key to effective sanctions

Johnson et. Al 10 - Andy Johnson, Director, National Security Program, Kyle Spector, Policy Advisor, National Security Program, Kristina Lilac, National Security Program, Senior Fellows of The Third Way Institute, (“End the Embargo of Cuba”, Article for The Third Way Institute, 9/16/10, <http://content.thirdway.org/publications/326/Third_Way_Memo_-_End_the_Embargo_of_Cuba.pdf>)

Keeping the embargo in place requires that the US government devote time and resources to fighting a Cold War -8 era threat. Senator Chris Dodd argued in a 2005 op ed that the US spends “extraordinary resources” each year to enforce the sanctions instead of devoting such resources to the fight against terrorism. 4 While the financial resources dedicated to enforcing the embargo may be limited compared to resources dedicated to other causes, lifting the Cuban embargo could put the US in a better position to fight terrorist organizations by freeing up resources currently enforcing the embargo. For example, the Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), which governs travel and trade between the US and Cuba, is also responsible for maintaining sanctions against truly problematic countries, including Iran and North Korea. OFAC also is responsible for responding to economic threats posed by terrorist organizations and narcotics traffickers. By ending OFAC’s need to regulate the Cuban embargo, OFAC could instead devote those resources to respond to the current threats posed by rogue states and terrorist networks

That independently strengthens sanctions on Iran

Maberry and Jensen 13 – J. Scott Maberry, J.D, Georgetown University Law Center, International Trade partner in the Government Contracts, Investigations & International Trade Practice Group, Mark L. Jensen, J.D, Harvard Law School, International Trade associate in the Government Contracts, Investigations & International Trade Practice Group, (“OFAC gets hot, bothered on Iran and Cuba: how economic sanctions work today”, Report for Sheppard Mullin Richter & Hampton LLP, 5/7/13, <http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=8657e6ce-454a-4eaf-ba8b-d225ea59ecdd>)

People who practice U.S. economic sanctions law like to talk about how sanctions are policy-oriented, or an engine of U.S. foreign policy. Whereas some laws may be more opaquely political, economic sanctions and embargoes seem to express most bluntly how international leverage works through regulation. And yet, a few recent regulatory developments show that the direction that sanctions take is not always predictable. The U.S. Department of Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) has had a raucously busy year. A torrent of development in laws and regulations on Iran served as the unsurprising focus of this year’s OFAC symposium, held on March 19, 2013, in Washington D.C. Among the developments were sanctions imposed on non-U.S. banks, a new executive order related to the purchase of petroleum and petrochemical products from Iran, an expanded scope of the Iran Transactions and Sanctions Regulations to companies “owned or controlled” by U.S. companies, and a new statute that targets sectors of the economy related to goods and services to Iran, including secondary financial transactions in energy, shipping, shipbuilding, precious metal, and graphite. See our recent posts on Iran here and here. Perhaps the most striking aspect of the Iran sanctions program is its proliferation into not only additional laws and regulations, but also additional regulatory regimes. The Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010 (“CISADA”), the National Defense Authorization Act for 2012 (“NDAA”), and Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 (“ITR”), have created a polyglot system focused on individual sectors of the economy. OFAC presenters at the March symposium gave the sense of a proliferation of laws that is undoubtedly aimed at accomplishing U.S. foreign policy goals. But the laws are paradoxically both targeted (at industries, vessels, banks) and incredibly expansive in jurisdiction. The system is the embodiment of the powerful yet somewhat disorganized U.S. government piling on everything it can to economically overwhelm Iran. The Iran program also serves as a good case study of how far and wide economic sanctions can be made to reach. If legislation of past years has proved anything, it is that the U.S. Congress appears ready to use any and all means within its legislative authority to sanction Iran. Insofar as Congress is able to map out the reach of the U.S. financial system and economy further, it seems likely that additional sanctions will be applied.

That solve Iranian prolif

DeLeon et al 12 - Rudy deLeon, National and International Security, John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, Recipient of The Defense Civilian Distinguished Service Award in 1994, 1995, and 2001, National Intelligence Distinguished Service Medal in 2001, Former US Senior Department of Defense Official, Senior Vice President of National Security and International Policy at American Progress, with Brian Katulis, Peter Juul, Matt Duss and Ken Sofer, (“Strengthening America’s Options on Iran”, Report for The Center for American Progress, April 2012, <http://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2012/04/pdf/iran_10questions_INTRO.pdf>)

\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*NOTE: P5+1 is comprised of: United States, Russia, China, United Kingdom, France and Germany\*\*\*\*\*\*\*

Indeed, amid an array of political transitions and military conflicts around the globe, the prospect of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons has galvanized a global debate on how to stop the regime in Tehran from getting the bomb. This debate has spilled over into the domestic politics of the world’s great powers, becoming a talking point in the 2012 U.S. presidential election and the subject of behind-the-scenes discussion during China’s transition to its next generation of political leadership at their Party Congress this fall. In the Middle East and Central Asia, Iran’s nuclear program has implications for the ongoing civil war in Syria, a political transition beset by economic troubles in Egypt, and U.S. and NATO ground combat operations in Afghanistan entering their 10th year. Oil price surges worldwide threaten economic recoveries around the globe—recoveries Iran could thwart in a number of ways depending on how it reacts to global pressure to come clean on its nuclear program. Events are quickly producing a decision point: A concerned Israel warns the diplomatic community that its window for military options to delay or deny Iran’s potential weapon is not unlimited due to the progress Iran has made in hardening its nuclear facilities beyond Israeli capability to penetrate them. At the same time, a vigorous roster of nations is tightening the burden of economic sanctions against Iran—isolating the country’s already feeble economy, which survives only because of its vast oil reserves. Iran—a longtime supporter of terrorism, both directly and through its proxies, with a track record of dissimulation on its nuclear ambitions—has no reservoir of credibility or good will, and its repeated professions that its nuclear program is peaceful deserve no benefit of the doubt. Of course Iran could quickly defuse the crisis and allow the inspectors of the International Atomic Energy Agency full access to all facilities of interest so it can measure and catalogue Iran’s capability to produce highly enriched uranium (the essential element required for weapons production), and Iran could come clean on its known nuclear weapons research. As IAEA Director General Yukio Amano affirms, Iran needs “to cooperate fully with the [International Atomic Energy] Agency on all outstanding issues, particularly those which give rise to concerns about the possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear program, including by providing access without delay to all sites, equipment, persons and documents requested by the Agency.” It is Iran’s lack of response that fuels concerns about their nuclear ambitions. Importantly, there is a strong bipartisan consensus in America and within the inter national community on this single point—an Iranian nuclear weapon would destabilize the one of the world’s most important oil-producing regions at a critical point in the global economic recovery, would harm Israel’s security, and would severely undermine the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Unfortunately, much of the political debate in this U.S. election year now distracts from these central realities. Today the United States is leading a successful three-year global effort to isolate Iran diplomatically and implement a broad range of strict economic sanctions targeted at undermining its nuclear program. The Obama administration’s initial outreach to the Iranian regime in 2009 did not achieve immediate constructive results, but the demonstration of American good faith forged greater international unity around the problem and served as an important force multiplier for subsequent successful efforts to pressure the regime. Now, as talks with the P5+1 approach, Iran must choose how to respond to the growing global concerns about its nuclear program and make the choice to live up to its international obligations or face increased international isolation. During the 2008 campaign, candidate Obama defended his proposed engagement policy by explaining that “we’re [not] going to be able to execute the kind of sanctions we need without some cooperation with some countries like Russia and China that...have extensive trade with Iran but potentially have an interest in making sure Iran doesn’t have a nuclear weapon.” Affirming his goal of “tough, direct diplomacy with Iran,” Obama acknowledged that diplomacy “may not work, but if it doesn’t work, then we have strengthened our ability to form alliances to impose tough sanctions.” Over the past three years, this is precisely what the Obama administration achieved. The engagement policy has served as an important force multiplier for efforts to pressure the Iranian government. By giving Iran repeated opportunities to meet its international responsibilities, this administration has been able to forge a far stronger and more enduring international coalition to pressure Iran. Far from strengthening the Iranian regime, as some critics have alleged, Obama’s engagement effort has in fact further isolated it. The United States and its partners in the P5+1 group are operating from a position of strength that would have been hard to imagine four short years ago. U.S. policy on Iran should not be determined by partisan politics and easy sound bites. Nor will U.S. policy objectives be quickly accomplished. Instead, this crisis requires policymakers and all citizens to challenge their own preconceived notions and make decisions based on facts while preparing fully for all contingencies.

Action now is key- attempts to prolif now

Tirone 7/17

(Jonathan, 2013, “Iran’s North Korea Links Draw Scrutiny at Nuclear-Weapon Meeting,” Bloomberg reporter, <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-07-17/iran-s-north-korea-links-draw-scrutiny-at-nuclear-weapon-meeting.html>)

The possibility that North Korea is sharing nuclear-weapon test data with Iran cannot be ruled out and is a proliferation risk, the former chief of a U.S. atomic-bomb laboratory said today at a meeting in Vienna.¶ “Sharing test information is a very dangerous thing to do,” Siegfried Hecker, director emeritus at the Los Alamos, New Mexico, nuclear-weapons lab and a researcher at Stanford University, told a meeting of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty Organization in the Austrian capital. He called the potential sharing “very troublesome.”¶ North Korea has tested three nuclear weapons with the most recent detonation on Feb. 12. Iran, under investigation for a decade over alleged nuclear-weapons work, maintains “strong” weapons ties with the secretive Asian regime, according to U.S. intelligence reports, which add that North Korea “retains the potential for exporting nuclear materials or technology.”¶ “Iran doesn’t need a nuclear weapon and has never claimed it would need to test in the future,” Seyed Hosseini, Iran’s deputy envoy to the CTBTO, said following Hecker’s remarks. “There is no diversion for military purposes.”¶ Hecker, 69, toured North Korean nuclear facilities in 2010 and was first to report on the country’s uranium-enrichment program. Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan, who sold atomic equipment to both North Korea and Iran, may have also provided data on his country’s nuclear-weapon tests, Hecker said.¶ Recognized nuclear-weapons states like Russia and the U.S. have detonated thousands of atomic bombs to increase the reliability and yield of their devices. Data on weapon effectiveness are closely held secrets. The nuclear-test-ban treaty wants to restrict proliferation by eliminating the ability of countries to experiment with new bomb designs.¶ ‘Nuclear Option’¶ “Iran has put all the things in place to build a bomb without taking a decision to do so,” said Hecker. “They want the nuclear option.”¶ In order to keep that option without conducting a nuclear test of its own, Iran will need data from other nuclear-weapons countries, Hecker said, adding that North Korea will have to conduct additional testing in order to build a miniaturized nuclear device capable of fitting on a missile.¶ “They have a tunnel that’s ready to go if they want to test again,” Hecker said, pointing to satellite imagery showing a test facility south of February’s blast.

Only OFAC solves- close multilateral efforts

DoT 05 – United States Department of Treasury, (“OFAC”, Report Written for the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, June 2005, <http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/OFAC-Enforcement/Documents/ofac_sec_frb.pdf>)

OFAC administers and enforces economic and trade sanctions based on U.S. foreign policy and national security goals against targeted foreign countries, terrorists, international narcotics traffickers, and those engaged in activities related to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. OFAC acts under the President’s wartime and national emergency powers, as well as under authority granted by specific legislation, to impose controls on transactions and freeze assets under U.S. jurisdiction. Many of the sanctions are based on United Nations and other international mandates, are multilateral in scope, and involve close cooperation with allied governments. OFAC requirements are separate and distinct from the BSA, but both OFAC and the BSA share a common national security goal. For this reason, many financial institutions view compliance with OFAC sanctions as related to BSA compliance obligations; supervisory examination for BSA compliance is logically connected to the examination of a financial institution’s compliance with OFAC sanctions.

Iranian prolif causes extinction

Rubin, ‘9 (Barry, director of the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center in Israel and editor of the Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal, 3/9/09, http://articles.nydailynews.com/2009-03-09/news/17917609\_1\_nuclear-weapons-iran-middle-east)

If and when Iran gets nuclear weapons it would set off a global nightmare. Most obviously, Iran could use nuclear arms to attack Israel. It's easy to say that Iran's leaders would be cautious, but what if ideology, error, or an extremist faction decides to wipe the Jewish state off the map? Even a 10-percent chance of nuclear holocaust is terrifying. And if Israel decides its existence is at risk, it would launch a preemptive attack that would also produce a big crisis. That's just for starters. Once Iran has nuclear weapons, every Arab state, with the exception of Iran's ally Syria, would also be imperiled. Those countries would beg for U.S. protection. But could they depend on America, under the Barack Obama administration, to go to war - especially a nuclear one - to shield them? Uncertain of U.S. reliability, these governments would rush to appease Iran. To survive, the Arab states will do whatever Iran wants - which would come at high cost for America: alliances would weaken and military bases would close down. No Arab state would dare support peace with Israel, either. But Arab states wouldn't feel safe with just appeasement. An arms' race would escalate in which several other countries would try to buy or build nukes of their own. Tension and chance for nuclear war, whether through accident or miscalculation, would soar. The United States would eventually have to get dragged in. European allies would also be scared. As reluctant as they are to help America in the Middle East, that paralysis would get worse. As willing as they are to appease Tehran, they'd go far beyond that. Meanwhile, an emboldened Iran would push to limit oil and gas production and increase prices. Other oil producers would feel compelled to move away from their former, more responsible practices. Consumers' fears would push up the prices further. Yet there's worse. Flush with a feel of victory, Iran and its allies - Syria, Hamas, Hezbollah and Iraqi insurgents - would recruit more members to its cause. These terrorist groups would interpret the retreat of more moderate Arab countries and the West as signs of weakness and use it to fuel more aggression. Indeed, all Islamists, even those hostile to Iran, would view its achievement as a great Islamic victory. Hundreds of thousands would join or become active supporters of radical Islamist groups throughout the Middle East, in Europe and elsewhere. Fervent with a sense of divine favor and imminent victory, they'd escalate their operations. The result would be increased violence and possible civil war in every Arab state and far more terrorism in the West. Such a terrible scenario is likely even if Iran never actually uses a nuclear weapon on another country. This new era in the Middle East would bring risks and the probability of war for America that would dwarf all the region's current troubles and the crises faced by the United States in the whole world. And that's why it's so important to avoid Iran getting nuclear weapons in the first place.

Advantage 2 is Multilateralism

Absent a shift to multilateralism, US leadership will collapse and cause global nuclear war

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Unilateralism is the wrong approach for American Diplomacy. There is nothing to suggest its efficacy since 9/11. There is nothing to suggest its usefulness for future conflict. In allowing the US to go it alone, America's partners and allies risk the havoc and catastrophic consequences that will accompany "Imperial Overstretch." The residue of overstretch will include loss of US leadership in the world, an economy whose decline affects billions of dollars in international markets, and certainly emboldens rogue states. The whole world will pay the price if we let unilateralism pervade this century. As the bloodiest 100 years in recorded history, the 20th Century is replete with examples of how policy and practice intersect to foment war. The proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and the constantly mutating dynamic of terrorism inform our current, dangerous reality. Amidst this backdrop of destruction, there are lessons for those who are looking for them. Seeds of peacemaking and conflict resolution were planted which we must germinate in order to halt and then reverse the trend toward violence and chaos. Perhaps the 21st Century could be the first 100 years in which nations invest more in building peace than in making war. In the 20th Century, local conflicts ignited global tensions and genocide on an unprecedented scale, costing incalculable life and treasure. The two world wars and other explosive conflicts erupted over such issues as ethnic disputes, the securing of natural resources, corporate interests, ideology and religion. The international business of war produced economies of scale prompted by the industrial, technological, and communications revolutions. The assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria and his wife in Sarajevo by anarchist Gavrilo Princip was the spark that ignited WWI. In time, some 15 million people would be killed. The sheer brutality of that war led Woodrow Wilson to issue his "Fourteen Points" in 1918, which included the establishment of a League of Nations "for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike." Just like our present-day difficulties in pursuing compromise, the US Congress politicized the concept, bucked the President, and did not support that initiative. The subsequent failure of the League of Nations to prevent WWII may have galvanized our culture's distrust of multilateralism. Throughout the 20th Century and until today, nations and other entities have invested precious financial, intellectual, social, institutional and political capital into arming themselves with weaponry, instead of building their capacity for peace. Technologies change and improve with increasing rapidity, but those advances have included improvements in how to kill more people more efficiently and with smaller devices. WWII was the shining example of multilateralism and its power. Vietnam and Korea were examples of its limitations. South Africa and India demonstrated that the support of the international community could enable countries to pull themselves up by their own bootstraps. All these contribute and form the basis of the state of nations today. The 20th Century left us at a crossroads: will we perpetuate the machinery and culture of war or surpass our greatest dreams by encouraging and enforcing peace policies and practices worldwide? The 21st Century began ominously with the attacks of September 11, 2001, which ushered in a new era of US foreign policy and global response to war, conflict and terrorism. Rather than engage a sympathetic world in developing multilateral and inclusive strategies similar to the precursors to the 2003 Iraq War and as was done before the Persian Gulf War, the US squandered its global capital to pursue "pre-emptive" unilateral military action. The equal and increasingly matching reaction is a global culture of military aggression and war. The resulting disintegration of the international community contributed to the most serious economic disaster since the Great Depression. Already struggling to survive amidst broken economies, the proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and global terrorism strains multilateralism when it should embolden it. If it is true that every weapon invented is eventually used, we have much to fear if we do not reverse this lethal trend. Since national conflicts frequently spill over into regional and world-wide conflict, multilateral organizations have been very strong supporters of Truth and Reconciliation Commissions. Even the US found a way to first investigate and then come to terms with its terrible policy of putting Japanese-Americans in internment camps during WWII and apologized and paid reparations to survivors and their children. There were important Truth and Reconciliation Commissions in South Africa, supported by the international community. Victims and perpetrators of Apartheid who participated in Truth and Reconciliation Commissions demonstrated in compelling ways the healing and restorative power of those gatherings. Perhaps more importantly, they showed the world that a nonviolent response to unthinkable oppression and injustice can foster the peaceful development of a society intent upon making amends for the past and embarking upon a brighter, shared future. Since conflict-resolution and peacemaking at the local or national level work, why not apply it multilaterally? Concerned about the resurgence of unilateralism in the US's current Marjeh and Kandahar operations in Afghanistan, former Assistant Secretary of State Gene Dewey recently noted that "it's been very lonely being a leading multilateralist in Washington over the last nine years. Too few policy-makers have sensed where our unilateralism has led, and is leading." Saudi Arabia and other authoritarian Islamic countries generated the seeds that not only birthed the terrorists who carried out 9/11, but also attacks in Madrid, London, Mumbai and Chechnya. No matter where terrorists are determined to attempt to disrupt the lives of others, it's time for countries to realize that the only way to confront contemporary terrorism is through multilateralism. This must be a multilateralism that is thoroughly infused with peacemaking and conflict-resolution, instead of only "joint forces." At this crossroads, we can use the knowledge economy, social network and the international community to turn the rhetoric of hope into reality. We sit upon an historical precipice of policies and practices of sustainable, culturally responsive peace-building and violence prevention within and beyond our borders. Despite their faults, the institutions set up after in response to WWII (UN) and the Cold War (NATO) can be the 21st Century's vehicles for peace. We can use those instruments of multilateralism to build the peacekeeping, disaster relief, and conflict resolution forces that bring countries together. "Actually, I believe we have strategically shifted from that of a global war on terror (GWOT) to containing violent extremism (CVE). That said, the reason extremists do what they do is because they recruit from amongst the most desperate people on the earth. And, the reasons for desperation are strategic---but not necessarily military in nature. In fact, we have the capability to wage peace that is just as sophisticated as our capability to make war. Water, AIDS, mass migration of people, desertification, poverty, hunger, and disease---What would happen if our National Security Strategy became a multilateral one of economic engagement, and used the brain power and resources available to mitigate these issues?" -- Lt. Col. Matthew Canfield, U.S. Army (Currently on his second tour in Iraq) Concerns over economic stability, limited resources and security have divided us. Now is the time to create rather than divide common ground.

U.S. lead Latin American multilateralism is vital to solve hemispheric problems – their influence disads are wrong and selective engagement fails

Boniface, Prof. of Poli Sci @ Rollins, 2010

[Dexter, Associate Professor of Political Science and the Weddell Chair of the Americas at Rollins College, former research resident at the Center for Inter-American Studies and Programs at the Instituto Technologico Autonomo de Mexico, PhD in Political Science from the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, former Visiting Professor in International Studies at Rhodes College, “Latin American multilateralism: The U.S. perspective,” September 2010, <http://www.iadb.org/intal/intalcdi/PE/2010/06396.pdf>] Idriss

While the U.S. position in the world is in relative decline, the country continues to be dominant in a number of aspects. Its economy is the world’s largest and probably the most dynamic. U.S. industries are at the forefront of technological advances and its universities lead the world in terms of investment for research and development. The U.S. is the largest recipient of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the world and is a safe haven for investors in times of crisis. The weight of the United States is amplified at the regional level where, in spite of important regional variations, Latin America’s economies remain (for better or worse) largely dependent on the United States. On the one hand, the United States is the largest investor in Latin America and the largest source of FDI in the region, followed by Spain, Canada, Holland and Japan. On the other hand, it is also the region’s main trading partner: trade between Latin America and the United States is significantly higher than that with China and the European Union combined. Even in South America where several countries have sought new economic partnerships with Asia and Europe and pursued more independent foreign policies, the United States remains the largest trading partner. In 2008, the United States was the largest source of foreign imports and the leading export destination for every major country in the region except Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Paraguay and Uruguay. For their part, Central America, the Dominican Republic and Mexico, linked to the U.S. economy by the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the United States- Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA), remain as dependent on the U.S. as ever. Furthermore, the links between the U.S. and Latin America are not only economic but also social and cultural; this is evidenced by consumption patterns, migration and tourism. The bottom line is that the fate of Latin America is still closely tied to that of the United States. The increased presence in the region of extra- hemispheric actors, such as China, India, Iran and Russia (not to mention Japan or Spain), has generated many headlines heralding the end of the Monroe Doctrine. Yet the presence of such extra-hemispheric actors is actually less relevant than it seems. Chinese trade and investment in the region, for example, have grown dramatically but remain heavily concentrated in the commodity sectors of certain South American countries, especially Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Peru. Furthermore, in other sectors such as textiles, electronics and light manufacturing, China is a fierce competitor, especially for Mexico and Central America. Thus, although the increased presence of Asian and European countries has caused a slight decline in the U.S. position in the region and contributed to a perception that Latin American countries have new options for integration, the U.S. economy remains a key factor in Latin America’s development. The final reason why the new multilateralism in Latin America will not substantially reduce the U.S. role in regional governance is that Latin America faces serious collective action problems to achieve co-operation without the participation of the United States. Past attempts at regional integration have resulted in many forgotten acronyms and even in the most successful cases these attempts have not succeeded in promoting deep integration. Despite the recent efforts of Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez, Brazilian President Luis Inácio Lula da Silva and others, Latin American countries are far from reaching agreements to co-ordinate security, energy and development policies, adopt a common currency, or even establish something as simple as a common visa policy. The reality is that Latin American states are divided into distinct subgroups with conflicting political and economic interests. Furthermore, in some cases, such as between Bolivia and Chile, and between Colombia and Venezuela, there is open hostility. In short, the new multilateralism in Latin America has not achieved tangible results which would suggest that U.S. influence in regional governance is decreasing dramatically. At the same time, there are still many steps that can and should be taken to revive and promote co-operation between the U.S. and Latin America. The Obama administration: A new partnership? How should the United States and the administration of U.S. President Barack Obama in particular respond to the new challenges of Latin American multilateralism? In a sense, this question is part of a broader issue related to U.S. foreign policy for it is not only the inter- American system but also the entire architecture of Western-dominated global institutions that need reconfiguration in the new millennium. It makes perfect sense to start the process of reform in the Americas. The United States effectively has two options: maintain the status quo or promote the “new partnership” that Obama defended in his campaign for the presidency. The first option, inherited from former president George W. Bush and softened by Obama, is not ideal, though it has some benefits. The crux of this strategy, described as “multilateralism à la carte,” is to selectively engage interested parties on narrowly defined issues. This strategy allows the United States to develop closer ties with key partners such as Canada, Colombia and Mexico and, at the same time, avoid the conflict entailed by deepening its relations with a broader set of actors and a wider range of topics. The strategy effectively sidelines the hemisphere’s fiercest critics of American policy such as Chávez, former Cuban leader Fidel Castro, Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa and Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega in favor of a wait-and-see approach, which is premised on the assumption that these radical regimes will eventually collapse under the weight of their own contradictions before their deepening ties with Iran or Russia pose any substantial security risk to the United States or our allies. The approach is pragmatic, because it minimizes the problems of collective action, and also efficient in the sense that U.S. influence increases in a bilateral or selectively multilateral setting. It is, however, a strategy lacking long-term vision. For one, several of the most important problems in the region —drug trafficking, environmental conservation and migration among others— are essentially transnational issues for which bilateral and partial solutions are insufficient. Second, on issues such as arms control and energy security where the United States has strategic interests at stake, a wait-and-see approach is obviously inadequate. Finally, much like the debate on the reform of the United Nations Security Council and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), these discussions are critical to the legitimacy of the United States. An alternative strategy demands a new commitment to revitalize the hemispheric agenda. Although Obama’s policy proposal for a “New Partnership for the Americas” outlines a number of sensible changes in U.S. policy toward Latin America, the document ultimately fails to respond to the challenges of the new Latin American multilateralism in the region. To adapt to a new global and regional environment, the United States needs to develop a new foreign policy approach that is at once firm and flexible and, above all, must explore multiple mechanisms for co-operation on issues of common interest. Thus, the United States should seek to strengthen traditional inter-American institutions such as the OAS and the IDB but also facilitate the creation of new and potentially more dynamic mechanisms of co-operation. This paper puts forward three ideas on how the U.S. could fulfill the promise of a new partnership with Latin America. First, the Obama administration must continue to distance itself from the unilateral policies of the previous Bush administration. It is important that President Obama makes it clear that multilateral co-operation is the core of U.S. foreign policy and that the unilateralism of the Bush era was a temporary aberration. As was seen during the 2009 Fifth Summit of the Americas in Trinidad and Tobago, the Obama administration’s renewed emphasis on dialogue and diplomacy has paid dividends in terms of the improved U.S. image in the region. Yet the recent (and avoidable) conflicts with regional leaders over the use of military bases in Colombia and the use of military force to deliver humanitarian assistance to Haiti after the country’s devastating earthquake, demonstrate that the countries in the area remain sensitive to the use of U.S. military force in the region. President Obama must therefore show more sensitivity on this issue than he has so far. Second, although it is essential that the United States listens to the leaders of Latin America and encourages the development of regional initiatives, the U.S. presence in the region must remain robust. The recent democratic crisis in Honduras confirms this. Although a consensus was quickly reached on the illegality of the overthrow of former president Manuel Zelaya and on the suspension of Honduras from the OAS, the failure of the United States to articulate a strong and consistent policy led to a power vacuum since no other country in the region had the same level of influence in this country. When the United States subsequently took more decisive actions to break the deadlock in Honduras, it had the unintended consequence of rupturing the regional consensus. This situation caused the United States to be diplomatically upstaged by Brazil on the issue of democracy promotion —even as Lula remained silent about the abuses of power by Chávez and Ortega, and rolled out the welcome mat for Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

Multiple scenarios –

Scenario 1 is Conflict Management

Multilateral institutions like the Organization of American States are critical to deescalating riparian disputes and conflict management – contains and outweighs all scenarios

Hensel, et. Al, Profs. of Poli Sci @ UNT, MSU, & Lamar U, 2006

[Paul R. Hensel, Professor of Political Science at the University of North Texas, PhD in Political Science from the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, Professor of Political Science at the University of Iowa, PhD in Political Science from Michigan State University, Thomas E. Sowers II, PhD in Political Science from Florida State University, Assistant Professor of Political Science at Lamar University, “Conflict management of riparian disputes,” Political Geography 25 (2006) pg. 383-411] Idriss

One of the key problems limiting cooperation between states in the international system is the lack of an overarching authority to enforce agreements. In the domestic sphere, the government can intervene to enforce contracts. Because of the lack of a central authority internationally, states are forced to find other mechanisms to enforce their agreements. One of the options available is for states to create institutions. Although these institutions do not enjoy the same amount of power as a government, they provide a structure for the enforcement of an agreement that should mitigate the need for militarized disputes to resolve conflict. Institutions offer a potential solution to the problem of managing common water resources. Institutions can serve to provide assurances that treaties will be followed by riparians (Sowers, 2002). A treaty without effective enforcement mechanisms is not likely to offset future conflict. 11 Institutions can serve as an outlet for conflict management by providing an arena for riparians to resolve their differences, by providing neutral information, reducing uncertainty, and minimizing transaction costs (Keohane, 1984). Some institutions explicitly manage water- related conflicts, such as regional trade agreements in Africa (Powers, 2004a, 2004b). When an effective institution is present, a riparian dispute can be referred to the institution for resolution, which diminishes the possibility that the disputing parties will resort to the threat or use of force. Institutions may also have a more passive effect on conflict management (Mitchell & Hensel, 2005), by creating regular forums that facilitate bilateral negotiations between members and encouraging norms of peaceful conflict resolution (Russett & Oneal, 2001). Institutions created by the United States and Canada to resolve their river conflicts provide great examples of the benefits of river-specific institutions for conflict management. The International Joint Commission (IJC) has existed since 1909 and regulates all shared water between the United States and Canada. Disputes between the riparians are referred to this international commission, which works to resolve contentious issues. The IJC has been effective in regulating the Great Lakes and overseeing numerous hydroelectric projects that involve both states. The United States and Canada also belong to a number of regional and global organizations that call for peaceful dispute settlement, such as the Organization of American States, the Rio Pact, and the United Nations. These shared institutional memberships create more general forums for peaceful negotiations over river issues. Thus we expect that institutions (river-specific or general) designed to manage riparian conflict will decrease the likelihood of militarized conflict, and increase the frequency and effectiveness of peaceful conflict management.

Riparian disputes magnify conflict – their defense doesn’t assume future scarcity levels, only we solve

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These results, particularly those for river-specific institutions, suggest that international institutions can help to overcome obstacles to cooperation in an anarchic international system. Even when the issue at stake is as important as water, a vital resource for human existence, we find that river institutions have been quite effective at reducing militarized conflict over the rivers in question and at promoting the success of negotiations over river-related issues. This is particularly consistent with the work of Mitchell and Hensel (2005), who suggest that institutions can have a ‘‘passive’’ effect of promoting conflict resolution among their members, even if they are not having an ‘‘active’’ effect by settling the conflict through direct involvement.34 Several caveats to our analyses are in order, though. First, with respect to the militarization of river claims, it is clear that fewer river claims lead to militarized activity than is popularly believed. For all the academic and policy-oriented discussions of ‘‘water wars’’ dominating future conflict, we have identified only 17 militarized interstate disputes between 1900 and 2001 that explicitly involved attempts to alter the river-related status quo. One partial explanation for this lack of ‘‘water wars’’ e even in the Middle East, the region where most expect the worst conflict to occur e is that river-specific institutions have made a positive contribution to avoid armed conflict over rivers. Such institutions did significantly reduce militarized conflict in our analyses where they were present, although conflict was still rare even where no institutions existed at the time of the claim. Another partial explanation for the relative rarity of armed conflict over rivers may be that these river claims have not taken place in areas with the most extreme water shortages, and that future conflict might be more likely as water demands rise and water supplies decrease in both quality and quantity. Our analyses revealed that greater levels of challenger water scarcity increase the likelihood of armed conflict, so as scarcity levels are expected to rise in coming decades, we might reasonably expect militarized conflict to rise as well e although there is still room for hope if effective river institutions can be put into place to try to manage rivers peacefully.

Independently, border disputes coming now despite current effort

Oppenheimer 9/25/13- a Latin America correspondent for The Miami Herald (Andres, “Escalating border disputes hurting Latin America”, September 25 2013, http://tbo.com/list/news-opinion-commentary/escalating-border-disputes-hurting-latin-america-20130925/)//CW

Despite constant presidential summits proclaiming a new era of Latin American economic integration and political brotherhood, an escalation of border conflicts in recent weeks should draw alarm bells everywhere.¶ Judging from what I’m hearing from U.S. and European diplomats, escalating tensions between several Latin American countries over century-old border disputes are not only resulting in growing military expenditures, but are also affecting talks on trade, investment and security issues with the region.¶ U.S. and European officials complain that it’s hard to negotiate agreements with Central American or South American economic blocs because their members refuse to sit at the same table with their neighbors because of border disputes or political conflicts.¶ Among the several territorial disputes that have been heating up in recent weeks:¶ Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos, speaking Sept. 18 aboard a warship patrolling waters that are being disputed between his country and Nicaragua, said that Nicaragua’s latest legal claims against Colombia at the International Court of Justice in The Hague are “unfounded, unfriendly and reckless.”¶ Santos, who has said that Colombia will not accept a recent ICJ ruling that would give Nicaragua 30,000 square miles of potentially oil-rich waters between the two countries, accuses Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega of having “expansionist goals.” Many Colombians fear Nicaragua is planning to invite Chinese companies to explore oil in the area.¶ Colombia is expected to bring the issue to the United Nations General Assembly this week.¶ Panama’s President Ricardo Martinelli, who is also accusing Nicaragua of encroaching on his country’s territorial waters, has said that he plans to sign a joint letter with Colombia, Costa Rica and Jamaica to U.N. Secretary Ban Ki-moon denouncing Nicaragua’s expansionist ambitions.¶ Ortega is not only quarreling with Colombia and Panama over territorial waters, but also with Costa Rica over land along the San Juan River on their common border.¶ That long-standing conflict escalated in recent weeks after the Nicaraguan president made a rambling speech before his country’s army seemingly suggesting that Nicaragua may seek to make a legal claim before the ICJ over Costa Rica’s province of Guanacaste.¶ Costa Rican President Laura Chinchilla issued a statement on Aug. 15 calling Nicaragua an “adversary country” that “invaded” part of her country two years ago. The two presidents accuse one another of inflaming nationalist passions to cover up for their domestic political troubles.¶ Bolivia earlier this year took its territorial claims against Chile to the ICJ, demanding a passage to the Pacific Ocean through what is today northern Chile. The two countries do not have full diplomatic relations, and Bolivia’s President Evo Morales recently accused his Chilean counterpart of “lying” about the conflict.¶ Peru, which took its dispute with Chile over waters along the two countries’ maritime border to the ICJ in 2008, is expecting a ruling within the next few months.¶ U.S. officials say Washington’s efforts to negotiate economic agreements with the Central American Integration System, the region’s economic bloc, have been hurt by the fact that the presidents of Nicaragua and Costa Rica will often not sit at the same table, or go to summits hosted by the other country.¶ Asked whether the Obama administration is concerned about this, Roberta Jacobson, the State Department’s top official in charge of Latin American affairs, told me that although the United States is not getting involved in these territorial disputes, “it is always a concern when partners and allies in this hemisphere have tensions with each other. It complicates cooperation.”¶ European diplomats, in turn, complain that Paraguay’s suspension from South America’s Mercosur economic bloc and a lingering political dispute between Paraguay and Venezuela over membership in that bloc have further complicated long-delayed European Union-Mercosur free trade negotiations.¶ Jose Miguel Insulza, head of the 34-country Organization of American States, told me in an interview last week that “this is a problem, because no extra-regional interlocutor will be very interested in conducting a negotiation when all parts of the deal are not sitting at the same table.”

The OAS is key to resolve – it solves hemispheric confidence-building – disputes are inevitable in the squo

Herz April 08 (Monica, Director, Institute of International Relations, Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro, Author of Ecuador vs. Peru, Development Studies Institute, “DOES THE ORGANISATION OF AMERICAN STATES MATTER?”, https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&ved=0CC4QFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fmercury.ethz.ch%2Fserviceengine%2FFiles%2FISN%2F57413%2Fipublicationdocument\_singledocument%2Fdf9c52a2-2dc9-4ca6-9a4e-05fa2a399a31%2Fen%2FWP34.2.pdf&ei=q1IaUujIAavy2gX5yYCQAQ&usg=AFQjCNHJfVZsoHNpbVFXZrs\_-\_5MVpD-kA&sig2=QzMXH1oWhtsczkMOq4OosA)

Nevertheless, one must remember that boundary disputes exist today and were sources of conflict in the past. The territorial disputes in the hemisphere at present are: Peru-Chile- Bolivia (Chile and Bolivia do not have diplomatic relations); Nicaragua and Costa Rica; Nicaragua and Colombia; Colombia and Ecuador; Colombia and Venezuela; and Venezuela and Guiana (ABIN 2007). ¶ Moreover, guerrilla warfare was present from the late 1950s onward, and the war in Colombia is the most vivid example of this reality today. Intra-state wars (as defined by the Correlates of War Project) occurred in twelve countries since the 1950s.7 Currently drug traffic and transnational criminal activities in general have become the most acute threat to states and individuals alike, and the social and economic problems that characterise the region could give rise to international conflicts over resources and migration. The domestic political and social situation in many Latin American countries could generate internal conflicts. The fragility of domestic mechanisms for conflict resolution and the state apparatus in general has generated political crises throughout the history of the southern part of the Americas. Ecuador, Haiti, Venezuela and Bolivia are countries where institutional or violent crisis is a possibility in the medium term. ¶ The OAS and the Management of Security From the brief overview presented above it is apparent that the institutions that are mandated to manage security in the region face a number of tasks: Among these institutions, the OAS is the most universal, including all countries in the hemisphere and geared towards the multidimensional problems in place. ¶ The OAS, IATRA and the Pact of Bogota (Treaty on Pacific Settlement of Disputes) are supposed to be the pillars of the hemispheric security system. The Pact has never been applied, however. The OAS and IATRA have worked in conjunction, providing a security framework. As we have seen, either the Permanent Council or the Meeting of Foreign Ministers serves as the Organ of Consultation for both the OAS Charter and the Rio Treaty and makes decisions aimed at addressing security threats perceived by the member states. ¶ Other institutions are also part of the group of regional mechanisms for the management of international security, although only the OAS congregates all hemispheric sovereign countries: ad hoc regional arrangements, such as the Rio Group,8 the Guarantors of the Peru- Ecuador Treaty;9 the Summit Meetings;10 and the Meeting of Defence Ministers11. Two specialised organisations deal with nuclear questions: the Brazilian-Argentine Nuclear Accounting Agency; and the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean. Institutions such as the Caribbean Community and Common Market, the Andean Group, Mercosul and the Union of South American Countries, geared toward economic, cultural and social integration, also play a part in the creation of a common security agenda. ¶ The relations between the OAS and the Summit Meeting are the most relevant for the purposes of this article since the Summit process has provided guidance beyond the Charter and the Rio Treaty for action in the sphere of security. Regarding the other forms of cooperation, the levels of coordination do not have any significant results. Initially the Summit process was to develop an autonomous agenda, but the OAS has increasingly taken the Summit’s orientation as a guide for action. In the context of the Third Summit of the Americas held in Quebec City in 2001, the OAS was officially designated as the Secretariat of the Summit of the Americas Process. At the Miami Summit in 1994, the Heads of State and Government assigned mandates to the OAS in several areas such as drugs, corruption, terrorism, hemispheric security, sustainable development and the environment. The OAS incorporated these mandates into its agenda on a priority basis. ¶ The OAS security structure was designed for collective security operations and for dispute settlement through diplomatic consultation. Chapter VI of the Charter endorses the principle of collective security – an attack on one is considered an attack on all. Regarding conflict between states in the hemisphere, the emphasis lies on peaceful means for the settlement of disputes. Chapter V outlines the procedures to promote this. The legalist tradition, profoundly rooted in Latin American international culture and also relevant in inter-American relations more generally, is firmly associated with the norm of peaceful conflict resolution and reinforces it. ¶ When a security threat is detected, either the Charter of the OAS or the Rio Treaty may be invoked. There is no established norm regarding which treaty is invoked and in some cases both documents have been used.12 The political process in each case will determine the selection. The difference in tone between Article 60 of the Charter and Article 6 of the Rio Treaty may determine the choice of one or the other. The Rio Treaty indicates that stricter sanctions could be applied. The Permanent Council of the OAS meets and determines whether the request is justified and whether to convene the Organ of Consultation. Frequently an investigating committee is formed and reports back to the Organ of Consultation. Finally, resolutions may be voted for. Several options are available: sending an observation committee, sanctions or even the use of armed force. At any point the organisation may consider the crisis solved or may simply choose to withdraw from the case. The Special Representatives and Envoys of the Secretary-General are engaged in preventive diplomacy and mediation in the hemisphere’s trouble spots and/or appointed to head OAS electoral observation missions. ¶ The OAS has had some success in reducing regional tensions and preventing conflicts from escalating (Shaw 2004: 96). This was the case in the conflict between Costa Rica and Nicaragua between 1948 and 1979, and the Soccer War between Honduras and El Salvador in 1969. It has functioned as a forum for discussion of inter-state as well as intra-state conflict since its creation. Investigative commissions were created in a number of cases to offer assessments and sometimes indicate solutions to situations of conflict or controversy. It has also been a major forum for the process of generating regional norms on security, regarding the peaceful solution of disputes, the association between democracy, stability, security and arms control and the mechanisms to fight transnational criminality. The use of military capabilities is extremely rare. The only Inter-American Peace Force was created in 1965 and sent to the Dominican Republic after its civil war and US military intervention. ¶ During the Cold War, the containment of the ideological threat of communism was the main pillar of the concept of security in the Western Hemisphere and at the OAS. The IATRA and the doctrines of national security developed in most Latin American countries reflected this logic. The definition of threat was framed in Cold War terms for the first time at the 10th Inter-American Conference in Caracas, in 1954. A resolution was issued defining a government under communist control as a threat to the hemisphere.13 The treatment of the Dominican Republic political crisis of 1965 and the Cuban Revolution within the same framework followed. The Declaration of San José, issued during the Seventh Meeting of Foreign Ministers in August 1960, explicitly makes use of Cold War discourse, mentioning the threat of extra continental intervention by the Soviet Union and China and that the ‘inter- American system is incompatible with any form of totalitarianism’ (OAS 1960). The 1960s can be characterised as the period when the OAS was most clearly used as an instrument of US foreign policy partly because many countries in the region accepted the bipolar ideological view of international relations sponsored by the US. ¶ During this period the OAS mediation of the dispute between El Salvador and Honduras, in 1969, was the clearest expression of the organisation’s capacity to be effective beyond the Cold War confrontation. During a World Cup soccer tournament in July of that year, border incidents between El Salvador and Honduras occurred. The large migration of Salvadorians to Honduras (around 300,000) generated social pressure, and riots against the migrant population took place in Honduras. As a result, El Salvador invaded Honduras. The day after the fighting began, the OAS met in an urgent session and called for an immediate ceasefire and withdrawal of El Salvador’s forces from Honduras. The OAS negotiated the dispute, put pressure on El Salvador to withdraw and a ceasefire was reached. The threat of OAS economic sanctions against El Salvador and the dispatch of OAS observers to Honduras to oversee the security of Salvadoranians remaining in that country were fundamental for the temporary resolution of the dispute. This was a clear case of preventive diplomacy, more specifically ‘pre-emptive engagement’, according to Lund’s terminology. Violence had begun, with 2,000 dead and thousands displaced, but was not widespread and the OAS acted successfully to create channels of communication, turning the norm of peaceful resolution of disputes into a reality while also using inducements and pressure. After only four days of fighting a ceasefire was reached. Thereafter, the OAS engaged in conflict resolution, allowing the disputes between the two countries to end peacefully. ¶ In other cases the OAS was also able to avoid violence that faced the region during the period. The OAS functioned as a conflict prevention mechanism in the operational sense, supporting the return to stability or status quo in many instances, and as a forum for conflict resolution and social environment for the maintenance of the norm of peaceful conflict resolution. The following are the cases in which the Charter or the Rio Treaty was invoked to deal with a security threat in the region, in the period up to 1990 (those in which conflict prevention was successful in stabilising the situation are in italics): [Chart omitted]¶ During the 1970s and 1980s the OAS became less active in the security sphere. The disagreements between the US and most Latin American countries tended to widen. Latin American countries supported moves towards greater engagement of the OAS in social and economic issues. The Protocol of Buenos Aires, which took effect in 1970, addressed some of the concerns of Latin American countries by creating the Inter-American Economic and Social Council. There was no consensus on the use of the OAS as part of the Cold War foreign policy of the US. In fact in 1975, the majority of Latin American states reversed the embargo on Cuba as they did not consider Cuba to be a threat.14 The OAS’s inaction during the 1980s conflicts in Central America,15 the marginal role it played in the Falklands/Malvinas War and the US unilateral decisions to intervene in Grenada in 1983 and Panama in 1989 led to greater emphasis on ad hoc regional arrangements, such as the Rio Group, the Summit Meetings, the Meeting of Defence Ministers or the Guarantors of the Peru-Ecuador Treaty. ¶ The OAS After the Cold War Since the end of the Cold War, an attempt to redefine the role played by the OAS has been made, prompted by a wide sense of failure, the new consensus on democracy in the region, the admission of Canada in 1990, different interests of regional actors and the wider debate on the redefinition of the concept of security. The OAS has become active in fostering confidence-building measures and land-mine clearing, and has continued its work on the dialogue on border disputes and attempts to prevent conflict. The range of activities in which the organisation has been involved has grown notably and new capabilities have been generated. Several institutional changes took place and new agencies were created such as the Committee on Hemispheric Security, the Unit for the Promotion of Democracy, the Inter- American Drug Abuse Control Committee and the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism. The Secretary General acquired new responsibilities. He or she is now authorised to bring to the attention of the General Assembly or the Permanent Council matters which might threaten the peace, security or development of member states. The Education for Peace Programme was also created.16 ¶ The effort to reshape the organisation also should be understood in the context of the generation of the idea that peace is a regional asset. The vision of a peaceful and stable region, in contrast to other parts of the world, is perceived by national elites of several countries as an advantage in the context of the current dispute over international investment flows. At the same time, policy makers and academics undertook a debate on the new role of the OAS as the literature quoted earlier testifies. ¶ In this new context does the OAS matter? Two different paths are taken in the remaining part of this article to answer this question. First, I point out that the OAS has developed two new roles in norm generation: a leading role in supporting the confidence-building agenda in the hemisphere; and a central role in generating the hemispheric democratic paradigm that associates security and democracy, allowing the organisation to have an active role in preventing intra-state conflicts. In addition, the OAS remains an important pillar of the norm of peaceful solution of disputes, which is an historical legacy of previous periods. Insofar as the states participate in norm construction and behaviour is changed, one can see these norms functioning as preventive diplomacy mechanisms. Secondly, I will show that the OAS prevented a number of international and domestic disputes from turning into violent conflict and was essential in diffusing several crises. ¶ In the sphere of security, in particular, a collective desire to redefine the role of the organisation can be observed. Several resolutions on cooperation in this sphere were passed, two important conventions were signed,17 a debate on the redefinition of the concept of hemispheric security was launched and the Hemispheric Security Commission was created in 1991, becoming a permanent body in 1995. The Commission has a mandate to review the hemispheric security system. Among the several issues under scrutiny we should mention the juridical and institutional link between the OAS and the Inter-American Defence Junta, the drive towards greater transparency in managing military capabilities, the special needs of small states and the debate on the concept of security itself; notably absent from debate is the current situation in Colombia. The Committee’s working groups completed their work during the last decade on the Inter-American Convention to Facilitate Disaster Assistance, on recommendations on natural disaster reduction to the OAS and its subsidiaries, on the modernisation needed to provide the OAS with technical, advisory, and educational expertise on defence and security issues, on a draft cyber-security strategy and on the juridical and institutional links between the OAS and IADB (OAS 2007a). The agenda for 2008 includes the following topics, according to the mandate established by the Permanent Council: disarmament and non-proliferation education; anti-personnel mines in Ecuador and Peru; the Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisitions; the Americas as an Antipersonnel-Land-Mine-Free Zone; confidence- and security-building; the work of the Inter-American Committee against Terrorism; the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test- Ban Treaty; follow-up to the Special Conference on Security; the illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons; the Treaty of Tlatelolco; criminal gangs; the Inter-American Defence Board; natural disaster reduction; special security concerns of the small island states; the implementation of Security Council Resolution 1540;18 the plan of action against transnational organised crime; the Inter-American Convention against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials; the Annual Report of the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD); and trafficking in persons. ¶ The redefinition of the concept of security involved the incorporation of an expanded concept and the shift from collective security to co-operative security (Tickner 1995; Buzan 1991; Matthews 1991). The expanded concept of security allows for the perception of the interdependence between economic, social, political and environment issues and threats and use of violence. The perception that so-called new threats to security such as drug traffic, illegal traffic of arms, intra-state violence and institutional failure of states could be tackled by the organisation became acceptable. At the Special Conference on Security, held in 2003 in Mexico, member states defined security in multidimensional terms. Thus efforts to deal with drug traffic, democratic stability, terrorism and mine clearing acquired new legitimacy. A new normative framework was generated and institutional mechanisms were produced. Some of the norms and mechanisms in question are part of the preventive diplomacy practice discussed at the beginning of this article. ¶ The emphasis on confidence- and security-building measures, which guarantee transparency of military procedures and the availability of information, replaced the stress on deterrence in the concept of collective security or collective defence (i.e. the idea that aggressors would have to face the combined force of a coalition) (Carter et al. 1992; OAS 1993; Dominguez 1993; Griffith 1998), ¶ The idea of arms control is not explicitly present in the Charter, but slowly entered the inter- American security environment in the late 1960s and early 1970s. In 1974, eight Latin American governments issued the Ayacuchu Declaration,19 affirming their support for the idea of arms control, and the Hemispheric Security Committee has taken on this subject. ¶ The Inter-American Convention against the Illicit Production and Traffic of Arms, Ammunition, Explosives and related Materials of 1997 expresses the link between the arms control agenda and the new prominence of the concept of cooperative security. On June 7, 1999, the OAS General Assembly in Guatemala adopted a landmark Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisitions. By June 2003, the Convention was signed by twenty OAS member states – all major hemispheric conventional weapons importers and exporters. ¶ The Contadora group mentioned earlier, the Ayacucho Declaration, the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, and the treaties that ended the nuclear dispute between Argentina and Brazil introduced the CSBM agenda, launched at the 1975 Helsinki Conference, to Latin America (Rodrigues 1999; Rojas 1996). The 1995 war between Peru and Ecuador reminded Latin American leaders that the pending territorial disputes in the region, a legacy of the nineteenth century demarcation process, could be ignited into an actual exchange of fire. The US government, moving in the 1990s towards a more multilateral approach in the region, and the democratisation of Latin American countries permitted the introduction of the confidence-building agenda. In addition, the concern with the nature of civil-military relations in Latin America, given the region’s history of military intervention in public administration, and the search for new roles and identities for the military led local elites to acquire greater interest in the subject. ¶ In the 1990s the states in the hemisphere turned to the OAS as a catalyst for confidence building. The OAS has organised and sponsored conferences on confidence- and security- building measures, designed to strengthen military-to-military relations, deal with historic rivalries and tensions and create an environment that permits the governments of the region to modernise their defence forces without triggering suspicions from neighbours or leading to an arms race. ¶ In 1994, a meeting of governmental specialists on confidence-building measures and other security-related issues was held in Buenos Aires. This led to two conferences on the theme, held in Chile in 1995, and El Salvador in 1998. The Santiago Declaration called on OAS members to accept accords regarding the pre-notification of military exercises, to take part in the UN Register of Conventional Arms, to exchange information regarding national defence policies and to permit foreign observers to be present when military exercises take place. The Declaration of San Salvador expanded this agenda, dealing with political contacts, border cooperation, the exchange of information on national armed forces, the creation of accounting procedures for military expenditure and the institutionalisation of discussions on cooperative security through annual experts meetings. One of the CSBMs proposed by the 1998 San Salvador Conference on CSBMs was the establishment of a common methodology to measure defence expenditures that would facilitate comparison of military spending throughout Latin America. The governments of Argentina and Chile submitted a formal request to the Economic Commission for Latin American and Caribbean (ECLAC). Following the publication of Argentina’s Defence White Book in 1999, which contained the first-ever public accounting of its military expenditures, ECLAC began data gathering and analysis. ECLAC’s common standardised methodology for the measurement of defence expenditures is now available to all nations of the Hemisphere as an important CSBM that contributes to disarmament and the lowering of military expenditures. A meeting of experts took place in Miami in 2003, issuing two final documents that are now a reference for the debate on the subject (US Department of State, 2003). ¶ The countries of the region have also adhered to CSBMs on a global level, the OAS having approved the Inter-American Convention on Transparency in Conventional Weapons Acquisition in 1999. This initiative provides a framework for the advance notification of acquisitions of weapon systems covered by the UN Register. The data available on the participation of American states in different aspects of the confidence and security agenda attest to the wide involvement of countries in the hemisphere. Among the OAS countries, 26 have presented reports on the themes required. Moreover bilateral arrangements complement this trend, such as the joint operations and training between Brazilian and Argentine forces in particular. The experience of Latin American armies in Haiti can also be viewed as a confidence-building experience. ¶ As part of the transformation process, the IADB has acquired new and different roles. Its current programmes include mine clearing in Central America, reporting on confidence- and security-building measures, and developing educational programmes on regional security. The analysis of the military security- and confidence-building measures was initiated at the headquarters of the Inter-American Defence Board in 1995. Resolution 650 (1031/95) of the OAS Permanent Council tasked the IADB with the preparation of an inventory of the military security- and confidence-building measures in the Hemisphere. The Board provides a senior- level academic programme in security studies for military, national police and civilian leaders at the Inter-American Defence College (IADC). On March 15, 2006, the 32nd Special Session of the General Assembly formalised the IADB status as an OAS agency. Thus it is clear that a long process involving hemispheric states, and more particularly the military establishments in the region, has generated a norm regarding knowledge sharing and the diffusion of rules regarding military activities and arms procurements. This is a change in social interaction that prevents conflict by generating confidence. ¶ The second norm that the OAS had a central role in generating was the association between democracy and security, allowing for a role of the regional multilateral institutions in protecting democratic institutions where they were fragile or collapsing thus avoiding conflict. The new weight given by the OAS to the defence of democracy marked the international landscape in the region in the 1990s (Cooper and Legler 2001 & 2006; Massote 2007). In this case one should also notice the presence of other regional institutions playing an important role: the Rio Group, the Andean Group, the Caribbean Common Market and MERCOSUR. ¶ The theme was always present in declaratory terms in the OAS’s agenda, having been associated with the Cold War dispute. Some attempts to foster formal democratic institutions can be understood both as part of the US Cold War strategy and as the movement towards a regional regime for the protection of human rights and democracy. The Declaration of Santiago (OAS 1959: 4-6) issued by the Fifth Meeting of Foreign Ministers in 1959, explicitly mentions the importance of free elections, freedom of the press, respect for human rights and effective judicial procedures. During that meeting the American Commission for Human Rights was created. Nevertheless only in 1979 did the OAS begin its road towards a legitimising and supporting role in the consolidation and improvement of democracy in the Americas. At that moment a resolution condemning the human rights record of the Somoza regime in Nicaragua was passed. The 1985 Cartagena Protocol states the commitment to the promotion and the strengthening of representative democracy. The 1991 Declaration on the Collective Defence of Democracy, often referred to as the Santiago Declaration, called for prompt reaction of the region’s democracies in the event of a threat to democracy in a member state. Resolution 1080, passed by the General Assembly in June 1991 in Santiago, determines that the OAS Permanent Council should be summoned in case of the suspension of the democratic process in any member state, and thereafter a Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs could be summoned. Economic and diplomatic sanctions may be imposed. The 1994 Miami Summit of the Americas set the tone for a growing responsibility regarding the maintenance of democratic regimes in the Americas. In 1997, a reform of the OAS Charter took place through the ratification of the 1992 Protocol of Washington. The agreement strengthens representative democracy by giving the OAS the right to suspend a member state whose democratically elected government is overthrown by force. A new collective identity was fostered, led by the US, and made possible by the transition of most Latin America countries to democracy in the 1980s. In fact, the OAS relaxed its commitment to the principle of non-intervention in the process of constructing a regime for the preservation of democracy. Finally, in 2001 the Inter- American Democratic Charter was adopted, further institutionalising the democratic paradigm (OAS 2001). This new Charter creates procedures for cases of formal disruption to democracy and for situations when democracy is at risk. It was first formally applied when a coup d’etat was attempted against President Hugo Chaves of Venezuela in 2002. ¶ In this context, the OAS Unit for the Promotion of Democracy (UPD), now the Department for the Promotion of Democracy, was established in 1991. It provided assistance for the development of democratic institutions and for conflict resolution. During the first years of its activities, the UPD concentrated on the area of electoral observations. Following the First Summit of the Americas in 1994, it got involved in programmes for the support of peace processes on the continent. The UPD took part in several electoral observation missions on national and municipal levels, supporting training, educational, research and information programmes (Thérien and Gosselin 1997). Since 1990 the OAS has set up 92 electoral observation missions in 20 different countries (OAS 2007b). ¶ The Inter-American Forum on Political Parties fosters debate and research on issues pertaining to the political system of states, such as campaign financing and confidence in the political system. The OAS has also promoted national dialogue in countries where political institutions may be facing a crisis – such as Guatemala, Haiti, Nicaragua, Peru, Suriname and Bolivia – and generated training and educational programmes geared towards the generation of a democratic culture. These activities are part of the conflict-prevention toolbox and the extent, and importance of the activities allow us to assert that the OAS plays a major part in guaranteeing democratic stability in the region. These activities can be categorised in a different manner, but from the point of view of conflict prevention, in a region where intra- state and inter-state violence has often been generated by domestic political instability, this is a fundamental contribution for the prevention of violent escalation of disputes. ¶ After the end of the Cold War we can also verify that the OAS played an important role in conflict prevention dealing with situations that could have escalated into violent conflict. In the following instances the Charter, Resolution 1080 or the Inter American Democratic Charter were invoked: [Chart Omitted]¶ The OAS has also been involved in conflict resolution and national reconciliation since the 1990s. It took part in post-conflict reconstruction in Nicaragua, Haiti and Guatemala. ¶ The International Commission for Support and Verification (CIAV, Comisíon Internacional de Apoio y Verificación) was the context in which the OAS, in conjunction with the United Nations, dealt with the pacification of Nicaragua. Peace building in Nicaragua was a coordinated enterprise undertaken by the OAS and the UN (Seresere 1996). The OAS would receive returning combatants and their families inside Nicaragua. The Commission aided in the reintegration of approximately 120,000 combatants and their families into post-war Nicaraguan society, was able to include non-combatants in the programme and mediated local conflicts. The OAS also monitored the 1996 elections, which saw a successful transition from one elected president to the next. CIAV ended operations in July 1997. ¶ The OAS was assisted the mine-clearing operations in Nicaragua, the General Secretary of the organisation having requested the IADB to plan the operations. Subsequently a wider project to remove mines from Central America was implemented. The mine-clearing programme was created in 1991 and was conducted under the general coordination of the UPD with the technical support of the IADB. ¶ The OAS also aided the process of pacification in Suriname, where its crucial role as mediator led to the signing and fulfilment of the 1992 peace accord. The OAS mission helped collect and destroy weapons from armed groups that had operated throughout Suriname’s rural areas. In 1993 and 1994, the OAS monitored compliance with the peace accords and assisted in the removal of land mines. ¶ When a coup d’etat took place in Haiti in September 1991, the OAS was the first international organisation to react, issuing a Permanent Council resolution condemning the coup, and demanding respect for the democratically elected government (Berenson 1996). An ad hoc Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs was called, pursuant to the mechanism established under Resolution 1080. The meeting called for full restoration of the rule of law and the reinstatement of President Aristide; and suspension of economic, financial and commercial ties with Haiti was recommended. In October, the creation of a Civilian Mission to re- establish and strengthen constitutional democracy was authorised by the meeting of Consultation. Secretary General Baena Soares sent OAS human rights observers to Port-au- Prince. After this initial OAS experience, the UN General Assembly approved a plan for a joint OAS/UN mission. Only after the action of the multinational force, led by the US in September 1994, was it possible to effectively put in place the peacekeeping mission authorised by the Security Council and the OAS/UN civilian mission could start its work. The International Civilian Mission to Haiti (MICIVIH) was the most advanced experience in cooperation between the OAS and the UN. In the context of the mission, collaboration took place in the areas of electoral observation, humanitarian aid, human rights monitoring, political negotiations, refugees, fuel supply and the economic recovery programme. After the signing of the Peace Accords in Guatemala in 1996, the OAS provided support for legislative and electoral reforms, aided the reintegration of ex-combatants and promoted the peaceful resolution of conflicts. ¶ The OAS continues to fulfill a role in conflict resolution between states. In September 2005, Belize and Guatemala signed an agreement at the OAS establishing a framework for negotiations and confidence-building measures, to help maintain good bilateral relations while they seek a permanent solution to their longstanding territorial dispute. The OAS is supporting that effort through its Fund for Peace. In April 2006, El Salvador and Honduras reach an agreement regarding their common border, the OAS having played an important role in support of negotiations. ¶ Conclusion I have argued in this article that the OAS has followed the orientation of its mandate, particularly after the 1990s, in a limited but important area: preventive diplomacy. The organisation matters because it plays a role in preventing the escalation of both intra-state and inter-state disputes into violent conflicts. I have pointed out that in 18 different instances the OAS played a relevant role in preventing the escalation of disputes into violent, or more violent, conflict. The capacity of the OAS to generate communication channels through mediation and institution building is its greatest contribution. ¶ Three norms developed partly within the organisation are part of the preventive diplomacy mechanisms in place: the drive towards the peaceful resolution of conflict; the norm of information sharing built into the confidence-building agenda; and the norm that stresses democratic institutional stability, associating democracy and security and allowing a more active multilateral interference in domestic political affairs. The pattern of behaviour observed in the pages above permits us to point out that institutions have been built, are functioning and have changed matters on the ground in several countries, preventing violence. ¶ I would also like to stress the technical assistance given by the organisation in several spheres to countries where the state apparatus or the institutions for conflict resolution are still fragile. The examples mentioned in this article pertain to information gathering, electoral assistance and other matters regarding political and judicial institutions. This assistances favours acquiescence to international norms and accords.

Scenario 2 is resource competition

Competition over resources is inevitable – it’s a question of if effective multilateral frameworks are in place to resolve disputes

Evans, Senior Fellow @ CIC, 2010

[November 2010, Alex, Senior Fellow at the NYU Center on International Cooperation, MA in Politics from the University of Edinburgh, “Globalization and Scarcity: Multilateralism for a world with limits,” New York University Center on International Cooperation, http://cic.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/evans\_multilateral\_scarcity.pdf] Idriss

The US National Intelligence Council’s 2008 report on global trends to 2025 observed that “even actions short of war will have important geopolitical implications as states undertake strategies to hedge against the possibility that existing energy supplies will not meet rising demand”, noting trends including Chinese and Indian purchases of equity stakes in energy fields, energy-deficient states employing “transfers of arms and sensitive technologies and the promise of a political and military alliance as inducements to establish strategic relationships with energy-producing states”, and increased naval competition “in a zone extending from the Persian Gulf to East and Southeast Asia”. As Michael Klare summarizes: “...the leaders of most countries involved in the great energy race have come to view the struggle over hydrocarbon assets as a “zero sum” contest ... a zero-sum mentality leads to a loss of flexibility in crisis situations, while the lens of nationalism turns the pursuit of energy assets into a sacred obligation of senior government officials.” 185 More recently, a similar dynamic has been seen in the context of inter-state competition for land and food , as import-dependent countries seek to agree overseas security of supply deals for food or land. While there is often a lack of transparency about such deals, among the examples reported in the media are Chinese attempts to secure 1.24 million hectares of land in the Philippines (in a deal subsequently blocked), 700,000 hectares in Laos, 2 million hectares for biofuel production in Zambia and 2.8 million hectares for the same purpose in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 186 Other key food importers, including the United Arab Emirates and South Korea, have also sought to improve their good security with similar deals. More acute forms of competition for food include the export restrictions discussed in the previous section. At the same time, countries that are not dependent on imported grain can also contribute to this emerging competition for land and food through their own land use policies: as already noted, the IMF, World Bank and Goldman Sachs all argued in 2008 that the single most significant driver of the food price spike was the diversion of US agricultural land to biofuel production. 187 On water, the key risk comes from trans-boundary fresh water resources. Today, there are 263 rivers that either span or delineate international borders. 188 It is important to note that so far, trans-boundary water resources have tended to trigger cooperation rather than conflicts between the countries that share them: research by Oregon State University, for example, finds that “cooperative interactions between riparian states over the past fifty years have outnumbered conflictive interactions by more than two-to-one.” 189 However, the same research also finds that 158 of the world’s 263 international river basins “lack any type of cooperative management framework.” 190 Moreover, with the prospect of climate change to consider, there is no guarantee that the future will look like the past. A particular concern here is the fact that many water-sharing agreements are based on a set volume of water rather than a percentage of what is available. 191 The risk of glacial retreat, most notably in the Himalayas, has also triggered concern about future water-driven conflict risks – as well as controversy, given the recent furor over erroneous IPCC projections that 80% of Himalayan glaciers would have disappeared by 2035. Existing glaciers provide dry season water resources to 1.3 billion people living in river basins including the Mekong, Irrawaddy, Indus, Ganges, Brahmaputra, Yangtze and Yellow River. 192 As temperatures rise, some estimates (still valid, despite the recent IPCC controversy) suggest the risk of future dry season flow reductions of as much as 60-70% on the Ganges. 193 These kinds of forecast have led to increased concern about the potential risk of capture of water resources by particular countries (for instance in India, where there are fears about the potential for China to dam and divert the Brahmaputra river). 194 Another dimension of inter-state strategic resource competition centers on the impacts of climate change, and particularly the effects of rising sea levels . Current international law on maritime borders awards countries territorial rights extending 200 miles offshore from their coastlines, for example – but is silent on what happens if those coastlines recede because of climate change. 195 This grey legal area introduces the potential for future conflicts over issues including: • Border disputes, including in the South China Sea and the Gulf of Mexico; • Ownership of undersea energy resources (notably in the Arctic); • Newly navigable waterways (such as the North-West Passage and Northern Sea Route); • The sovereignty rights, resource claims, and populations of low-lying island states that disappear under rising sea levels; • The fate of ‘climate refugees’, which some estimates suggest could number 200 million by 2050 (although the number is disputed, and UNHCR also questions the very idea of ‘environmental refugees’). 196 Why is multilateral cooperation needed? Of all of the areas of action considered in this paper, it is in the context of strategic resource competition that the case for multilateralism is clearest. While the extent of globalization today may be unprecedented, conflict over resources is one of the oldest stories in the book – and it is, after all, preventing violent conflict between states that forms the principal raison d’être of the UN system.

Absent those protectionism and escalatory resource wars are inevitable

Evans, Senior Fellow @ CIC, 2010

[November 2010, Alex, Senior Fellow at the NYU Center on International Cooperation, MA in Politics from the University of Edinburgh, “Globalization and Scarcity: Multilateralism for a world with limits,” New York University Center on International Cooperation, http://cic.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/evans\_multilateral\_scarcity.pdf] Idriss

Climate change and resource scarcity have the potential to pose an existential challenge to globalization. While interdependence, complexity and prosperity have all increased massively over the past few decades as globalization has accelerated, the process has been neither sustainable, nor resilient, nor equitable. Now, scarcity issues – together with other global risks such as financial crises, pandemics like swine flu, or trans-boundary security risks such as terrorism and arms proliferation – are part of a range of threats to globalization that epitomize why this greater sustainability, equity and resilience is needed. Inevitably, the fact that increasing globalization has come with ‘shadow sides’ will lead some voices to argue that the process of globalization should be slowed, halted or even reversed. The risk of protectionism as a misguided response to the credit crunch and the ensuing global downturn remains very real. A global flu pandemic could lead to borders becoming less porous to international travel and migration. Scarcity issues could provide an even larger impetus for pulling away from global interdependence – whether towards greater, or towards intensifying competition (or conflict) for dwindling resources. This paper, however, has suggested that there is an alternative – that rests on more globalization and interdependence, not less. Crucially, though, it has argued that effective multilateral institutions and responsible sovereignty are the key to effecting this shift, and to nudging international relations towards increased levels of non-zero sum cooperation on scarcity issues instead of an intensifying zero sum competition for resources. It is not yet clear whether the process of creating a multilateralism capable of coping with scarcity will be a big bang (perhaps following a systemic crisis) or a slow, evolutionary process. What is already clear, though, is that it is a process that policymakers and publics have no real choice but to embark on together – and soon.

Protectionism causes nuclear war

Panzner 8 – faculty at the New York Institute of Finance, 25-year veteran of the global stock, bond, and currency markets who has worked in New York and London for HSBC, Soros Funds, ABN Amro, Dresdner Bank, and JPMorgan Chase (Michael, “Financial Armageddon: Protect Your Future from Economic Collapse,” p. 136-138)

Continuing calls for curbs on the flow of finance and trade will inspire the United States and other nations to spew forth protectionist legislation like the notorious Smoot-Hawley bill. Introduced at the start of the Great Depression, it triggered a series of tit-for-tat economic responses, which many commentators believe helped turn a serious economic downturn into a prolonged and devastating global disaster. But if history is any guide, those lessons will have been long forgotten during the next collapse. Eventually, fed by a mood of desperation and growing public anger, restrictions on trade, finance, investment, and immigration will almost certainly intensify. Authorities and ordinary citizens will likely scrutinize the cross-border movement of Americans and outsiders alike, and lawmakers may even call for a general crackdown on nonessential travel. Meanwhile, many nations will make transporting or sending funds to other countries exceedingly difficult. As desperate officials try to limit the fallout from decades of ill-conceived, corrupt, and reckless policies, they will introduce controls on foreign exchange. Foreign individuals and companies seeking to acquire certain American infrastructure assets, or trying to buy property and other assets on the cheap thanks to a rapidly depreciating dollar, will be stymied by limits on investment by noncitizens. Those efforts will cause spasms to ripple across economies and markets, disrupting global payment, settlement, and clearing mechanisms. All of this will, of course, continue to undermine business confidence and consumer spending. In a world of lockouts and lockdowns, any link that transmits systemic financial pressures across markets through arbitrage or portfolio-based risk management, or that allows diseases to be easily spread from one country to the next by tourists and wildlife, or that otherwise facilitates unwelcome exchanges of any kind will be viewed with suspicion and dealt with accordingly. The rise in isolationism and protectionism will bring about ever more heated arguments and dangerous confrontations over shared sources of oil, gas, and other key commodities as well as factors of production that must, out of necessity, be acquired from less-than-friendly nations. Whether involving raw materials used in strategic industries or basic necessities such as food, water, and energy, efforts to secure adequate supplies will take increasing precedence in a world where demand seems constantly out of kilter with supply. Disputes over the misuse, overuse, and pollution of the environment and natural resources will become more commonplace. Around the world, such tensions will give rise to full-scale military encounters, often with minimal provocation. In some instances, economic conditions will serve as a convenient pretext for conflicts that stem from cultural and religious differences. Alternatively, nations may look to divert attention away from domestic problems by channeling frustration and populist sentiment toward other countries and cultures. Enabled by cheap technology and the waning threat of American retribution, terrorist groups will likely boost the frequency and scale of their horrifying attacks, bringing the threat of random violence to a whole new level. Turbulent conditions will encourage aggressive saber rattling and interdictions by rogue nations running amok. Age-old clashes will also take on a new, more heated sense of urgency. China will likely assume an increasingly belligerent posture toward Taiwan, while Iran may embark on overt colonization of its neighbors in the Mideast. Israel, for its part, may look to draw a dwindling list of allies from around the world into a growing number of conflicts. Some observers, like John Mearsheimer, a political scientist at the University of Chicago, have even speculated that an “intense confrontation” between the United States and China is “inevitable” at some point. More than a few disputes will turn out to be almost wholly ideological. Growing cultural and religious differences will be transformed from wars of words to battles soaked in blood. Long-simmering resentments could also degenerate quickly, spurring the basest of human instincts and triggering genocidal acts. Terrorists employing biological or nuclear weapons will vie with conventional forces using jets, cruise missiles, and bunker-busting bombs to cause widespread destruction. Many will interpret stepped-up conflicts between Muslims and Western societies as the beginnings of a new world war.

Resource wars cause extinction – best case studies prove

Rosen 10 – Professor of Law and Policy @ GWU

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The seminal anthropological study by Jared Diamond provides historical support for the proposition that natural resource scarcity can lead to conflict that threatens U.S. security.[17] Diamond identified five contributing factors: environmental damage, climate change, hostile neighbors, friendly trade partners, and a society’s response to environmental problems that led to conflict among adjoining states and, ultimately, the risk of implosion leading to extinction.[18] Diamond asserts that [W]e shouldn’t be so naÃ¯ve to think that study of the past will yield simple solutions, directly transferable to our societies today. We differ from past societies in some respects that put us at lower risk than them; some of those respects often mentioned include our powerful technology (i.e., its beneficial effects), globalization, modern medicine, [etc.] . . . . We also differ from past societies in some respects that put us at greater risk than them: mentioned in that connection are, again, our potent technology (i.e., its unintended destructive effects), globalization (such that now a collapse even in remote Somalia affects the U.S. and Europe), the dependence of millions (and, soon, billions) of us on modern medicine for our survival, and our much larger human population. Perhaps we can still learn from the past, but only if we think carefully about its lessons.[19] Diamond’s anthropological study of the extinction of civilization on Easter Island in the South Pacific is a useful case study of the linkages between cultural decline and unsustainable use of carbon-based energy sources. Easter Island was blessed with a temperate climate and fertile soil as a result of volcanic activity.[20] However, the island’s temperateâ€”as opposed to tropicalâ€”climate and its geographic isolation meant that Easter Island was not endowed with as many fish species or freshwater supplies as some of its tropical counterparts.[21] Carbon dating of remains discloses that Easter Island was settled sometime around 900 A.D. and thrived until roughly 1700 A.D.[22] At one point, Easter Island had extensive agricultural activity, sophisticated systems for raising chicken and other livestock, incredible skill in stone masonry/engineering, and technology to construct large outriggers that could travel thousands of miles through the open ocean to engage in trade.[23] By the 1700s, however, the island’s populations of plants, wildlife, and people were in steep decline.[24] Diamond notes that during the good years, much of the island became increasingly deforested as the islanders consumed palms and hardwoods for various uses, including the manufacture of charcoal for heating and cooking.[25] By the 1400s almost all trees had disappeared.[26] Once the trees disappeared, the islanders were no longer able to construct boats for trade.[27] Wild sources of food were lost because there were no forests to sustain wildlife, and the population exploited fish stocks to extinction.[28] Agriculture also collapsed: the loss of forests led to top soil erosion and nutrient loss as crops were defenseless against wind and rain.[29] Starvation became the order of the day, leading to civil war, population crash, and cannibalism.[30] Captain Cook visited the island in 1774 and observed that the islanders were “small, lean, timid, and miserable.”[31] The number of home sites in the coastal region “declined by 70% from peak values around 1400â€“1600 to the 1700s. . . .”[32] By 1872, only 111 islanders were left on Easter, compared with a minimum population of 6000 to 8000 before the crash began.[33]

3 Internal Links – Embargo removal is key

First, nations see it as a filter for U.S. policy in the region

Olopade, Media Scholar @ Yale, 2009

[4/15/09, Dayo, Knight Law and Media Scholar at Yale University, holds degrees in Literature and African Studies from Yale University, journalist who has formerly been a Fellow at the New America Foundation, a United Nations Foundation Journalism Fellow, and a visiting scholar with the Rockefeller Foundation, “Cuba: The Phantom Menace,” <http://dayoolopade.com/2009/04/15/cuba-the-phantom-menace/>] Idriss

Ever since President John Kennedy placed the trade and travel embargo on Castro’s regime, U.S.-Cuban relations have been a proxy for other political concerns—the Cold War struggle against Communism, American global authority and tangled domestic politics within the swing state of Florida, where many Cuban Americans are concentrated. Today, leaders from large nations like Argentina, Mexico and Brazil view the cause of Cuban openness as a proxy for their own relationship with the United States. The dozens of nations in the continent that do recognize Cuba reportedly resent a “Cubanization” of regional policy—and “have made Cuba the litmus test for judging Washington’s policy toward Latin America,” said Julia Sweig, director of Latin Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, at a conference this week. The White House acknowledged as much the same day of its Cuba announcement: The U.S. has “neglected its relationships in this part of the world,” said Ambassador Jeffrey Davidow, director of American presence at the summit. “Whether one agrees with that perception or not, it certainly is a very strongly felt perception.” The U.S. delegation would like to focus the summit on three main subject areas: economic stability, energy action and public safety—the former because some 50 million people could drift back under the poverty line after the gains of the last five to six years, and the latter as violence related to drug trafficking has exploded along the U.S.-Mexican border in 2009. (The Department of Homeland Security recently appointed Alan Bersin as a “border czar” to help confront that problem.) The White House has said it will consider appointing a regional diplomat to handle Latin American issues, similar to the kind sent to handle climate change, the Middle East and Israel/Palestine. But, both because of the new shift in policy and the expectations of summit partners, Cuba may still have an oversized presence in deliberations—a presence it no longer really deserves. Despite today’s heated rhetoric surrounding Cuban human rights abuses, crackdowns on speech, retrograde labor practices or presidential posturing, the island nation has barely been of strategic significance to the United States since the founding fathers thought they would, after annexing Florida, turn Cuba into the next American state. With only 11 million people, it’s a fraction of the size of Brazil, which is hankering to join the UN Security Council, and the same size as Bolivia, which sits on important lithium deposits to be used in next-generation battery technology. It has no weapons, and no real enemies—besides the United States. Still, “unilateral sanctions are bad policy in almost every situation,” says William Reinsch, president of the National Foreign Trade Council. And Cuba has been a particularly ridiculous case in point. In addition to being hypocritical (the U.S. promotes free trade and is supposedly anti-terror; yet we don’t trade with Cuba, and former Cuban radicals live in the United States), the embargo is widely recognized to have been a failure. Both Castro and his brother, Raul, after all, are still running the country. And this stubbornness has enervated American allies in the Caribbean—as Obama may soon find out. So there is a large incentive to junk the failed policy toward Cuba—not because doing so would change anything about the 21st century world order, but because it presents an easy opportunity for Obama to signal that he’s a real change agent. Cubans have seen almost a dozen American presidents come and go with no shift in treatment—though polling suggests U.S. public opinion toward the communist state has softened in recent years. Havana is warming to more open relations, too. Todd Omestead, a reporter who recently returned from the city, said “there’s tremendous enthusiasm” in Cuba about the first black president of the U.S. (“Let’s do a trade: You take Raul Castro, we’ll take Barack Obama,” someone told him.) Indeed, even Fidel Castro is reportedly rooting for Obama to succeed. Following a trip to Cuba with the Congressional Black Caucus, Rep. Laura Richardson of California said that the elder Castro “watched the election, he listened to the speeches, and he wants Barack Obama to succeed…. He sincerely wants in his lifetime to see change in the United States.”

Second, it delegitimizes the OAS

Suver 4/24/12 (Roman, research associate at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs, Looking back on the Cuba distraction at Cartagena and the Failure of the US Latin America Policy”, www.coha.org/looking-back-on-the-cuba-distraction-at-cartagena-and-the-failure-of-the-u-s-latin-america-policy/

This pronouncement and the U.S.’ opposition to Cuba’s future involvement in OAS-related hemispheric gatherings effectively acted as a unilateral veto, as Canada was the only other summit attendee to oppose Cuba’s reintegration, though Prime Minister Stephen Harper reportedly considered supporting the majority position on Cuba’s unconditional readmittance. This stubborn and clearly ideologically-based U.S. move served to do nothing but further alienate the U.S. from the region at a time when it is actively attempting to build both economic and political alliances. Furthermore, by exacerbating the divide between traditional U.S. pan-American policy and the Latin American position through his comments, Obama ensured that the topic of Cuba would continue to dominate the discussion throughout the summit, instead of allowing for a unified hemispheric discourse on other important and pressing regional matters to command media attention. Not surprisingly, amidst the polarizing environment in Cartagena, the Sixth Summit of the Americas concluded without a joint declaration on the agenda’s subjects, further accentuating the dysfunctional nature of current hemispheric politics.¶ Ahead of the Summit, Ecuador’s President, Rafael Correa, wrote a letter to the summit’s host, Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos, in which he declared his intention to boycott the meeting in protest of Cuba’s ongoing exile. He further pledged that Ecuador would boycott any future gatherings that excluded Cuba as long as he remains in office, and urged fellow ALBA members to do the same. While it appeared last week that no other nation would take similar steps, Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega abstained from attending at the last minute, boycotting the event on the same grounds as Correa, despite his government’s presence in Cartagena. There had been speculation prior to the meeting that some Latin American countries, especially those with memberships in ALBA, would decline to join Ecuador in boycotting the event in hopes that the U.S. would soften its position on Cuba during the weekend’s meeting, making a gesture that could worsen trade relations with the U.S. unnecessary. However, after Obama’s steadfast reiteration of the U.S.’ stance, all eight ALBA members moved swiftly to decry the Cuban situation, vowing to boycott all subsequent Summits of the Americas if Cuba is not granted unconditional participation. Perhaps not so surprisingly, this same sentiment was echoed by some of South America’s most influential nations, including Mercosur members Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay.¶ The increasingly vocal and adamant calls for Cuba’s inclusion by Latin America, and the growing number of provocative comments being made by Latin American leaders about ending North American hegemony in the region, are ominous signs for the abiding strength of the U.S.’ influence in the region. With the prospect of the majority of the next Summit’s attendees boycotting the event under the current status quo, the future of the OAS and North American participation in Latin American affairs appears noticeably bleak. There are already a number of regional organizations which exclude the U.S. and Canada, CELAC and UNASUR among them, and their increasing relevance to international cooperation in the Americas does not bode well for North America. If the U.S. continues to persistently adhere to its current stance on Cuba through to the 2015 Seventh Summit of the Americas in Panama, there is a distinct possibility that the OAS could lose all legitimacy as well as its influence as exasperated Latin American countries refuse to participate. This could lead to both a rethinking of U.S. policy towards Cuba, and greater cooperation and concessions by the U.S., pursuant to a more unified and egalitarian Western Hemisphere dynamic. Conversely, if the U.S. continues its archaic and neo-imperialistic stance, bodies like CELAC would stand to gain considerable influence, and could perhaps even replace the OAS as the hemisphere’s primary pan-American body and standard-bearer for regional cooperation.¶ In either scenario, the inescapable reality becomes quite clear; no matter how U.S. policy towards Latin America evolves in the near future, the U.S.’ longstanding and powerful influence in Central and South America is beginning to wane. Newly developing export markets and swift economic growth in Latin America are bolstering the region’s ability to function independently of more developed powers like the U.S., and the more the region continues to develop, the stronger its thirst for self-determinism will become. As Central and South America continue to modernize in their quest to join the ranks of developed world powers, the U.S. will continue to watch its previously formidable regional will diminish. The more Washington is willing to proactively amend its foreign policy towards Latin America to promote a more respectful and reciprocal partnership arrangement, the better its prospects will become in forging long-term amicable alliances and beneficial economic partnerships with a rapidly upsurging region.

Third, removal is a necessary first step to effective conflict resolution models

Dickerson 10 – Lieutenant Colonel, US Army, paper submitted in fulfillment of a Master of Strategic Studies Degree at the US Army War College (Sergio M, “UNITED STATES SECURITY STRATEGY TOWARDS CUBA,” 1/14/10, <http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a518053.pdf>) //CW

At the international political level, President Obama sees resuming relations with Cuba as a real step towards multilateralism and leadership. U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon made the following statement about then President-elect Barrack Obama’s national election. “He spoke about a “new era of global partnership…I am confident that we can look forward to an era of renewed partnership and a new multilateralism." To highlight this point further, U.N. nations have voted overwhelmingly since 1992 to overturn the Cuban Embargo. In 2007, 184 nations voted against the embargo5 - a powerful statement about U.S. unilateralism with regards to Cuba. The argument can also be made that the U.S. has foreign relations with China, Saudi Arabia and other non-democratic governments while applying a different standard towardsCuba. With growing perception that Cuba no longer poses a credible threat to the U.S., it appears that U.S. policy has changed from coercive to punitive following the end of the Cold War. With a renewed focus on multilateralism, President Obama could go a long way to break this image by spreading the seeds of a “new beginning” in U.S.-Cuba relations. While dismissing Cuba’s immediate security threat to the U.S., we cannot ignore their 90-mile proximity to the U.S. shore. As we struggle to contain the illegal Mexican exodus into the U.S. and all the security concerns it poses, we neglect to see the historical similarities in past encounters with the Cuban government that led to similar incursions. So if we critically reexamine the current U.S. – Cuba embargo, why does the U.S. believe it will only lead to Cuban democratization? What about government collapse? A Cuban government collapse akin to Somalia could create a significant refugee situation not to mention an implied U.S. responsibility to provide humanitarian and even stability operations in Cuba. If catastrophe does occur, a search for causes would certainly lead back to our punitive approaches to U.S. diplomacy towards Cuba. On the other hand, consider that foreign diplomacy achieves a breakthrough under Raul’s Cuba. It could certainly hedge our influence in Latin America. According to Dr. DeShazo, “close bilateral relationships with Venezuela is a product of Fidel Castro-Hugo Chavez friendship and does not enjoy much popular support in Cuba-nor with Raul.” If true, perhaps having a U.S. - Cuba option can become an alternative to that relationship post Fidel Castro. Loosening or lifting the embargo could also be mutually beneficial. Cuba’s need and America’s surplus capability could be mutually beneficial - and eventually addictive to Cuba. Under these conditions, diplomacy has a better chance to flourish. If negotiations break down and a decision to continue the embargo is reached, international support would be easier to garner. Almost 21 years since the wall fell in Berlin, it is time to chip away at the diplomatic wall that still remains between U.S. and Cuba. This paper will further define our interests in Cuba and why President Obama should continue his quest for renewed diplomatic relations with Cuba. It will discuss potential risks associated with retaining the current 50-year diplomatic policy and give some broad suggestions regarding a new U.S. – Cuba foreign policy. Policy and National Interest Present U.S. policy towards Cuba is economic isolation imposed via embargo to coerce Cuba into establishing a representative government. While the basic policy remains unchanged, the same is not true about U.S. interests in Cuba. During the Cold War, stated U.S. interest was to contain Communism, the leading edge of which was Cuba. More than anything the U.S. wanted Castro’s demise but international support hinged on preventing the spread of communism. After 1989, communism was under siege and capitalism was on the rise. U.S. interests now shifted towards peace and regional stability. Of course, removing the Castro regime was still the preferred method, but without Soviet collusion Castro’s Cuba was no longer a credible threat to the U.S. Not surprisingly, international support quickly dwindled leaving the U.S. as the unilateral enforcer. In hindsight many argued it was the right time to loosen the embargo and seek better relations with Cuba. Instead, a renewed passion to topple Castro and establish democracy fractured any hopes to rekindle relations. In retrospect, Kennedy could not have foreseen a 50-year embargo that survives the Soviet Union’s demise but fails to remove Castro. The same cannot be said about the Obama Administration today. This section will analyze U.S. – Cuba policy, past opportunities and ultimate failure over the past 50 years. From 1959 to1964, beginning with President Eisenhower but shaped primarily by the Kennedy Administration, U.S. policy was to remove Fidel Castro and establish Democracy in Cuba.6 It can be argued that this policy resonates today but during the early period the U.S. actively pursued removal as the decisive action that would lead to Democracy in Cuba. Political and military efforts to remove Castro in 1961 were reinforced by the initial embargo implementation and tightening that was most effective. Between1965 and 1970, U.S. attempts to maintain a multilateral embargo failed and its effectiveness withered as western governments refused to acquiesce to U.S. - led sanctions. By the time the OAS officially lifted the embargo, Cuba had successfully diversified its trade portfolio and by 1974, 45% of Cuba’s exports came from western governments.7 The period 1965-1972, although officially endorsing the previous administration’s tough stance, largely ignored its neighbor while it dealt with the more pressing conflict in Viet Nam. Containment and a period of Presidential ambivalence towards Cuba allowed tensions to cool between nations. This coupled with a growing fatigue with the Viet Nam War resulted in a renewed engagement to normalize relations with Cuba. A policy of “rapprochement” or normalization began with the Nixon Administration and received promising traction under the Carter Administration in 1977. The rapprochement period, 1973 – 1980, was President Carter’s attempt to curtail communism in Africa and Latin America. By normalizing relations with Cuba, President Carter could leverage this good will to reverse Cuban presence in Ethiopia, Angola and Zaire. Several overt measures were taken to reduce embargo restrictions and in February, 1977 State Department spokesmen Fred Brown “publically acknowledged and accepted a Cuban proposal to begin bilateral talks on maritime boundaries and fishing rights.”8 In June, U.S. National Security Council decided to end the practice of blacklisting foreign ships that called on Cuban ports. Perhaps the most notable improvement that year was to allow foreign diplomats to occupy each other’s embassies. This allowed direct communication between countries; the previous practice had been to use Swiss and Czech proxies.9 Several incidents including the “Soviet Brigade” and the “Mariel Boatlift” in 1980 intensified this opposition and quickly derailed Carter’s initiatives in Congress. As President Reagan took office in 1980, U.S. – Cuba relations had already soured. The Reagan Administration would reinforce the weakened embargo and a return to a containment strategy under the auspices that Cuba was “promoting terrorism and subversion in virtually every Latin American country”. But strong Congressional opposition against normalizing relations took center stage during the 1980 presidential elections. Several incidents including the “Soviet Brigade” and the “Mariel Boatlift” in 1980 intensified this opposition and quickly derailed Carter’s initiatives in Congress. 10 The White House policy was to “disrupt and destabilize the island’s economy, terminate the Cuban-Soviet alliance, end Cuba’s internationalism, and finally reinsert Cuba within the capitalist politicaleconomic orbit.”11 President Reagan made every attempt to return to an “airtight” embargo but Cuba’s persistent trade with the west subverted the effort. In fact, British and Canadian companies could conduct trade in “America’s back garden without having to compete with U.S. companies.”12 Reagan did however, exact a toll on Cuba’s economy by preventing other nations from allowing Cuba to reschedule its debt: “a process of negotiating new loans to replace existing obligations, either by lengthening maturities, deferring of loan principal payment.”13 This action compelled Cuba to make its most overt concessions towards normalizing U.S. - Cuban relations. Castro removed troops from Africa and reclaimed 2,700 Cuban refugees that had departed to America during the 1980 Mariel Boatlift. Castro even allowed a U.S. Human Rights delegation to visit prisoners in Cuba. In return, the Reagan and Bush Administrations made no significant concessions to Cuba and status quo between countries remained. The last meaningful opportunity for change occurred after the fall of the Berlin Wall and particularly the window it presented the U.S. following the collapse in Soviet – Cuba relations. During the period 1990 – 1993, internal and economic turmoil following the Soviet Union’s break-up led to a drastic cut in Soviet subsidies and trade relations with Cuba. This action compelled Cuba to make its most overt concessions towards normalizing U.S. - Cuban relations. Castro removed troops from Africa and reclaimed 2,700 Cuban refugees that had departed to America during the 1980 Mariel Boatlift. Castro even allowed a U.S. Human Rights delegation to visit prisoners in Cuba. In return, the Reagan and Bush Administrations made no significant concessions to Cuba and status quo between countries remained. 14 This led to a 34% drop in Cuban economy forcing Castro to renew western trade options and relook his own draconian business and commercial practices. The first Bush Administration passed on this precious opportunity, ignoring Cuba’s overt concessions late in the previous administration and choosing instead to enact the 1992 Cuban Democracy Act reversing Carter’s amendment to allow third country U.S. companies from trading with Cuba.15 By the time President Clinton came to office, momentum had already shifted in Cuba’s favor. Cuba’s economy began to rise in 1994 reaching its apex in 1996 with a 41% increase thanks to foreign investments in tourism. The introduction of the HelmsBurton legislation in 1996 gained Congressional traction after the Cuban Air force shot down two, anti-Castro “Brothers in Rescue,” planes over Cuba. The Helms-Burton Act created unrealistic expectations for the Cuban government before U.S. would loosen restrictions with Cuba. A total of eight requirements had to be met and the most controversial of these included; a transitional government in place unlike the Castro regime; the dissolution of the Department of State; Cuba must hold free and fair elections and a controversial property law that allowed property owners that left Cuba as early as 1959, to make claims in U.S. Courts on that property. With Cuba’s economy on the rise, this new measure to tighten the noose failed terribly and only succeeded in further alienating both governments. The second Bush Administration did little to engage Cuba and after September 11, 2001, was completely engrossed in the War on Terror. U.S. policy towards Cuba has changed little in 50 years. Although the embargo continues to fail despite our best efforts to tighten it, our policy has remained steadfast and the U.S. is no closer to normalizing relations with Cuba. A History of Anger and Distrust After 50 years, deep-seated distrust and anger exists between the U.S. and Cuba. Perhaps an obvious assessment, but one that if ignored could undermine attempts to repair diplomatic relations between countries. Several diplomatic pitfalls developed over the years could hinder any attempt to reestablish relations. They could spell disaster and set an already tenuous relationship back decades. These triggers are subtle but recognizable over a long and tumultuous period in U.S. – Cuba relations. A historical account will help identify these political impasses and create favorable conditions for diplomatic success in future U.S. – Cuba relations. Experts argue over who’s started the dispute between nations: was it the Cuban Agrarian Reform Act in 1959 that nationalized agrarian land in Cuba to include U.S. owned lands? Could it have been Cuba’s decision to resume trade with the Soviet 9Union that led to a U.S. imposed embargo on Cuba in 1960? Perhaps the bigger issue was how diplomatic, economic and military efforts by both countries continued to aggravate already strained relations.16 In 1961, Cuban exiles supported by the Central Intelligence Agency failed to topple the Castro government. The Bay of Pigs fiasco sent Cuba a clear signal that the U.S. was not interested in negotiation. Castro answered immediately by allowing Soviets to position nuclear missiles in Cuba, threatening U.S. vital security and leading to the Cuban Missile Crises. These intentions have survived to the present undermining any attempt to pursue common interest and reduce tensions. The underlying fear that U.S. remains committed to toppling the Cuban government constitutes the first diplomatic pitfall in U.S. – Cuban relations. For this very reason, democratic reform will not succeed as a diplomatic bargaining tool with Cuba. Suspicions run deep among Cuban leaders and any inferences to government reform, albeit noble, will impede meaningful relations. Human rights advocacy, free trade and limited business opportunities in Cuba may be more plausible and could eventually encourage the long-term changes U.S. wants in Cuba. The embargo itself remains a perpetual albatross that continues to undermine any real diplomatic progress between nations. A series of coercive measures designed to topple the Castro regime began with U.S. – led efforts to expel Cuba from the Organization of American States (OAS) in January 1962 followed by trade prohibitions on imports and exports to Cuba by the U.S. Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). 17 This was achieved by leveraging an existing 1954 OAS Caracas Resolution designed to prevent trade with communist countries called Trading with the Enemy.18 After bilateral sanctions are established, U.S. pursued broader international support by 10enacting the October 1962 Battle Act prohibiting U.S. assistance to any country that traded with Cuba. An early attempt to persuade the North American Treaty Organization (NATO) nations to comply with the embargo yielded limited success.19 However, a new perceived security threat brought on by the Cuban Missile Crises in late 1962 gave U.S. the leverage it needed in February 1964 to convince NATO nations to effectively cease trade with Cuba. In July 1964, OAS followed NATO’s lead; U.S. had succeeded in isolating Cuba from its western traders.20 Tightening the noose placed extraordinary economic pressure on Cuba considering U.S. multilateral efforts reduced western trade by 73% in 1964. Cuba was obliged to subsidize this deficit with the Soviet Union and China between1961 – 1973. This trend continued by enticing Latin American and other western countries like Canada and England in the 1980s and following the Soviet fall in the 1990s.21Commensurately, Presidential administrations have loosened and tightened the embargo repeatedly as the climate between nations improved or deteriorated. The Cuban Defense Act in 1992 and the Helms Burton Act in 1996 tightened embargo restrictions signaling continued U.S. intentions to remove the Castro regime. But the U.S. - led embargo played right into Castro’s hand. Castro accused the U.S. calling it “another economic aggression” and stating that Cubans would have to undergo “long years of sacrifice.”22 By demonizing U.S. policy, he was able to galvanize Cuban support during the toughest times. The embargo helped create the American enemy, removing any popular support for rebellion and elevating Castro’s struggle to a legitimate Cuban struggle.11Castro was also complicit in the failure to mend U.S. – Cuba relations. Hiscontinued attempts to export communism began in Africa with a total 55,000 troops in Angola and Ethiopia by 1978. He focused efforts closer to Latin America by supporting Puerto Rican independence movement in 1975, the Sandinistas overthrow in Nicaragua in 1979 and the Farabundo Marti National Liberation (FMLN) in El Salvador. Cuba’s support to Columbia’s M19 (Columbian Election Day April 19, 1970) guerilla movement labeled Cuba a “state sponsor of terrorism” in 1982.23 Castro’s expansion efforts fueled U.S. security paranoia and prevented several overt efforts by the Carter Administration to improve relations with Cuba. In April 1980, an incident at the U.S. Mission in Havana led 120,000 Cubans to depart Mariel Port by boat to the U.S.24 The incident better known as the “Mariel Boatlift” became the tipping point that inhibited further relations with Cuba. Despite the growing tensions between the U.S. and Cuba, trade between the west and Cuba increased. NATO compliance with U.S. - brokered trade restrictions broke down after 1966 in particular due to British and Canadian opposition. U.S. efforts to use the OAS embargo to influence the United Nations also failed. In 1974, Latin American leaders pushed to end the OAS embargo. In 1975 the OAS lifted the embargo with Cuba and the embargo returned to a bilateral embargo now condemnedby most western countries.25 In 1982, Cuba’s failing economy led Castro to pursue western trade with a renewed vigor. By “1987, more than 370 firms from twenty-three European, Latin American, and Asian countries participated in Cuba’s largest ever annual trade fair.”26 Castro’s interest in improving U.S. - Cuba relations was perhaps the greatest from 1982-1988. Castro made statements in 1982 to resume talks with the U.S.; he took back more than 1000 Mariel Boatlift criminals that came to the U.S. in 1987 and pulled troops out of Angola in 1988 to mention a few. These rare moments and apparent seams in Castro’s armor were left unanswered by the Reagan and Bush Administrations. Instead renewed efforts to continue ratcheting a now largely ineffective bilateral embargo served only to increase animosity between both countries. It is difficult to quantify, but essential to note, that U.S. action over the years seems to support a hatred for Fidel Castro that interferes with any attempt to established diplomatic relations with Cuba. If true, to neglect this assumption could undermine any efforts to reverse our seemingly punitive approach. Perhaps it can be traced to his support for a Soviet-style communism. After all, few things in 1960 America were feared and despised more than communism. Any country affiliated with the communist movement became an affront to the American way of life. Furthermore, Americans shed blood in Cuba during the 1898 Spanish American War leading to Cuban Independence in 1902.27 Fidel Castro became evil’s face in Cuba and any attempt to partner with Castro seemed equally tainted. Fast forwarding to the present, with communism no longer a threat, perhaps it’s time to let the anger fade and deal with Cuba for its’ diplomatic merit not past indiscretions. The question remains whether clear objectiveness leads U.S. diplomatic efforts with Cuba? It is important to note that what’s at stake here is U.S. national interests and not the legacy of Fidel Castro. Another important pitfall is to exploit democracy as a precondition for diplomacy and economic engagement in Cuba. If democracy is virtuous, then why must we exploit it? It casts a negative shadow on a positive change in government. There is a common perception that U.S. policy with regards to security and stability can only exist under the precondition of a “Democratic Cuba”. It has prevented any real progress in U.S. – Cuba relations because of well placed fears that we mean to subvert the Cuban government. A popular Cuban American lobby group, The Cuban American National Foundation summarizes traditional U.S. beliefs towards Cuba. They suggest, “U.S. – Cuba policy should focus on (1) advancing U.S. interests and security in the region and (2) empowering Cuban people in their quest for democracy and prosperity…that these are “intertwined and one cannot be individually accomplished without the other.”28 The recommendation then focuses largely on steps to pursue a democratic Cuba. To separate security and stability from democratic pursuits in Cuba could benefit both causes. Focusing on better diplomatic relations could further democracy as a byproduct of increased exposure to open markets, businesses and globalization. China is a good example. The U.S. has diffused tensions with China by exposing them to open markets. Although they continue to embrace communism, their version of communism has been somewhat diluted as they modified their business practices, trade and other aspects to compete in the global marketplace. If you take into account that Cuba’s Growth National Product (GDP) decreased by 4% since 2006 while their debt grew by 16% to almost $20B in 2008, Cuba certainly has incentive to do the same.29 By imposing democracy we jeopardize diplomatic avenues to our principal security and stability pursuits. To assuage the Cuban America position on this issue may be simpler today than 10 years ago. Today’s younger Cuban-American generation is more amenable to closer relations with Cuba. The anger carried by their immigrant forefathers14after 50 years may be passing and perhaps the time is right to leverage this new Cuban American generation to open dialogue with Cuba without the democratic preconditions tied to negotiations. As we pursue diplomatic relations with Cuba we should not expect full disclosure, immediate results and a Cuban government anxious to please the U.S. We should expect a cautious and limited first engagement that appears noticeably weighted in U.S. effort. Let us assume the U.S. makes significant diplomatic and economic concessions but Cuba is less willing to provide some reciprocal offering. U.S. policy could conclude that Cuba has no genuine desire to consummate new diplomatic relations and diplomacy could fail. It is imperative to understand that the U.S. has done most of the “taking” and hence will, at least for the near future, do most of the “giving”. A steady, patient and continued engagement is needed until Cuba has the confidence to commit to further diplomatic relations. Current U.S.-Cuba Policy Analysis Understanding the deep-seated animosity and distrust that continues to fuel U.S. - Cuba tensions will aid us in properly analyzing the feasibility, acceptability and suitability (FAS) of current and future U.S. policy with Cuba. Identifying FAS applications to diplomacy, information, military, economic, finance, intelligence and law enforcement (DIME-FIL) will highlight weaknesses in current U.S. – Cuba relations that can be modified for future improvement. The logical question with regards to current U.S. – Cuba policy is whether it’s feasible to continue the current policy. At least for the foreseeable future, the answer is yes. It equates to doing nothing diplomatically, militarily and economically. Perhaps this 15option is appealing given a robust domestic agenda and U.S. involvement in two wars. According to Professor Schwab and other experts however, the U.S. has lost the information campaign targeted at the Cuban people. It has only, “buttressed Fidel’s popularity in Cuba and elsewhere, which eviscerates the very purposes the embargo was set up for.”30 It’s like the classic biblical story of David triumphing over Goliath – the bigger the oppressor the greater the victory. True or not, Fidel has made the case successfully to the Cuban people. While it’s feasible for the U.S. to pursue the current course there is no evidence it will succeed. How acceptable is it to U.S. foreign policy? There are three elements of national power that highlight our current policy: diplomacy, economy and law enforcement. It is subjective to evaluate acceptability strictly in terms of current national power invested and subsequent pay offs in foreign policy. U.S. needs international cooperation to achieve the coercive effects that only complete economic strangulation can accomplish. This is tough to do and North Korea and Iran bear this true. If we look at it from a broader international and economic perspective we can begin to see why it’s not acceptable. Take a UN General Assembly vote renouncing the U.S.-led embargo on Cuba for instance; since1992 there has been overwhelming vote to end the embargo.31 In essence, it has garnered sympathy for Castro and encouraged western nations like Canada and Spain to continue open relations with Cuba. Even if the embargo could work, U.S. diplomacy has failed to yield the international tourniquet needed to bring change in Cuba. Applying economic force without first garnering the necessary diplomatic support failed to achieve intended changes succeeding instead in hurting the Cuban people it hoped to protect. Whether or not an embargo can work in Cuba is suspect but succeeding without international support is impossible. Since the embargo hinges on a larger multinational participation, international and not just U.S. acceptability is necessary to achieve U.S. ends in Cuba. Several embargo refinements over the years like the Libertad Act have further tightened restrictions on Cuba. These restrictions have placed a heavy burden on the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the Customs and Border Protection (CBP) particularly in Miami. A 2007 GAO report highlights these burdens and how they impede other more important Law Enforcement activities in defense of the homeland.32 GAO findings suggest there’s a real need to balance U.S. paranoia for “everything Cuba.” This rebalancing purports an unacceptable cost-benefit to the current law enforcement aspect of the embargo. It diminishes our greater need to defend against terrorist, criminals and other real threats to our national security. In essence, our efforts to impose embargo restrictions are unacceptable tradeoffs for homeland security. In the final analysis, U.S. – Cuba policy is not sustainable because it has failed to meet desired national ends: Cuban democracy and human rights. Prior to 1989, the U.S. could make the argument that the embargo contained communism and generally marginalized the Castro government. It failed however, to depose Fidel Castro and democratize the Cuban government. A post Cold War Cuba no longer poses a threat to the U.S. - communism is contained and Cuba is still under embargo. Despite a 50-year failure to affect change in Castro’s government, our policy with regards to Cuba remains unchanged. We have foregone diplomatic engagement and chosen coercive economic power as our only political tool. Does Cuba Pose A Security Threat to the U.S.? Let’s begin by asking this question: can we afford to escort commerce through Caribbean waters from Cuban pirates? This sounds as farfetched as an attack from an Afghan-based Al-Qaida using commercial airliners to destroy the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. This scenario while unexpected is completely contrary to our policy objectives in Cuba. The greater possibility that “something” unfavorable happens in Cuba that threatens U.S. national interests is certainly more relevant. Although Cuba poses no traditional threats to the U.S., geographically, their 90-mile proximity should concern us. Our proximity to Cuba assures U.S. involvement, be it voluntary or involuntary, in a major crisis. Consider a disease outbreak that begins in Cuba over a break down in hygiene, government pollution or other misfortune attributable to economic strife. The disease has no boundaries and quickly reaches the Florida shores via travelling Cuban American citizens. This scenario could be mitigated or even preventable under the auspices of better relations. Aside from the obvious medical benefits a partnership provides, established communications with Cuba would likely prevent an uncontrolled spread in the U.S. There are definite advantages to having healthy regional partnerships to deal with regional problems. While economic pressure has failed to bring about government change, it could trigger a government collapse. If Cuba becomes a “failing” or “failed state” we could see a huge refugee flood into the U.S., increased crime and drug trafficking across U.S. borders, and renewed security and stability issue in the region. In 1980, 120,000 Cuban refugees fled Mariel and 20,000 more in 1994 after Cuba declared an open immigration policy.33 From 2004 – 2007, 131,000 Cubans have made residence in the U.S. Almost 38,000 settled in Florida alone in 2006. Although it’s mere speculation to presume Cuba will fail, if it did, there is no question where Cubans would seek refuge. A failed state could eventually draw U.S. involvement into nation building in Cuba taking a greater toll on our national resources. This scenario, while unexpected, is completely contrary to our policy objectives in Cuba. Current U.S. policy is no longer a sustainable option to achieving our national interests in Cuba. Until realignment can bring national policy back in line with national interests, conditions will not exist for real change in U.S. – Cuba relations. Proposed U.S.-Cuba Policy Analysis If today marks President Obama’s “new strategy” towards Cuba we must begin with U.S. National interests in the broader Latin American context. Over the past 50 years our approach has been germane to Cuba and not the larger Latin American construct. In so doing we have isolated Cuba from Latin America for coercive reasons yes, but also for the very democratic principles we hoped Cuba would follow. The State Department’s Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs (covers Canada and Cuba) has set the following goals for the region: “Economic partners that are democratic, stable, and prosperous; Friendly neighbors that help secure our region against terrorism and illegal drugs; Nations that work together in the world to advance shared political and economic values.”34 To simplify these goals, let us just say stability, economic prosperity and democracy. Using these as a benchmark, I propose our new diplomatic strategy towards Cuba must be similar - achieve economic stability, security and a representative government as the “end state” goal and not the prerequisite for engagement. President Obama can implement this policy by first building American and Congressional support for engagement. He should establish a formal infrastructure that communicates to Cuba and the International Community at large that we’re serious about diplomatic engagement with Cuba. Finally, we must loosen embargo restrictions and expose Cubans to U.S. open markets, business opportunities and 21st Century living. This combination will improve relations with Cuba by regaining their trust, improving their living conditions and exposing them to the democratic enticements we hope they will emulate. Achieving Congressional approval will be difficult although not impossible in the present economic recession. The economic benefits associated with new business opportunities in Cuba can encourage skeptics in Congress to mobilize. As a counterargument to a continued embargo, the President can point to the dangers associated with failed states like Somalia inadvertently caused by the very environment sanctions create. A strong communication strategy to gain American support coupled with a softening Cuban American stance, shrouded in economic opportunity, could encourage Congressional dialogue and resolution. President Obama can succeed if he sets realistic goals and expresses these to the American public before the media or his opposition defines these. We’ve established that coercive means have failed to achieve democracy and economic stability in Cuba. I’m suggesting there is another mutually beneficial alternative. Using China as an example, their exposure and need to compete in free global markets broadened their horizons and shifted their hard line communist approach to international diplomacy. This was a feat that coercive diplomacy has not accomplished in Cuba. Yet we still have civil disagreements with China on human rights issues, Taiwan’s right to independence and other contentious issues without resorting to coercive measures. Why should Cuba receive different treatment? The confusion lies with our tendency to impose democracy as a precondition for diplomatic relations. How can Cuba subscribe to small business practices, a free economy building block, if business opportunities are not available? Diplomatic engagement and economic encouragement has a better chance. Cuba’s economic condition incentivizes their willingness to begin diplomatic negotiations. The U.S. should begin by focusing efforts to establish diplomatic relations through incentives rather than coercion. We must also set the democratic precondition aside to pursue when the relationship matures and trust is reestablished. Exposing them to new opportunities will eventually, through their own discovery and U.S. shepherding, lead them to a more representative government. If we accept that reestablishing relations with Cuba is the first real step to a democratic end-state then the first action must be to appoint an Ambassador to Cuba. This diplomatic gesture signals that U.S. is serious about foreign relations. The Ambassador’s first actions must include setting the conditions with Cuba to allow a loosening of embargo restrictions. President Obama, in the spirit of multilateralism, should pursue international solidarity since some countries enjoying exclusive trade with Cuba would certainly protest the immediate competition. Choosing a time-phased removal would protect U.S. assets and interests in the remote possibility that Cuba fails to comply with the agreed bi-national or international terms. It might also sooth domestic and partisan anxiety regarding open trade with Cuba. President Obama must accomplish this early in his first term to allow time to reap success or mitigate failure before the next elections. The U.S. cannot afford to miss another opportunity to normalize relations with Cuba. A Cuba without Fidel is an opportunity – whether it is Raul or his replacement in 2013. The U.S. must lay the foundation today for renewed U.S. Cuba relations. Delaying could also signal the contrary to Raul Castro suspiciously awaiting the true purpose of recent U.S. concessions. While a long term goal may be to influence change in government, it cannot be the basis for initial success and continued diplomacy. With diplomatic patience and a prosperous Cuba, we have reason to believe, like China and Russia that capitalism will prevail over communism. But new politicians and a younger generation of Americans who measure success between terms and administrations will not understand if results aren’t immediate or commensurate to U.S. efforts. Instead, the strategy pursued must occur with a measured diplomatic optimism that insures immediate setbacks don’t derail the restoration of trust that must occur before complete reciprocation can be expected. Conclusion Today, 20 years have passed since the fall of the Berlin Wall – it’s time to chip away at the diplomatic wall that still remains between U.S. and Cuba. As we seek a new foreign policy with Cuba it is imperative that we take into consideration that distrust will characterize negotiations with the Cuban government. On the other hand, consider that loosening or lifting the embargo could also be mutually beneficial. Cuba’s need and America’s surplus capability to provide goods and services could be profitable and eventually addictive to Cuba. Under these conditions, diplomacy has a better chance to flourish. If the Cuban model succeeds President Obama will be seen as a true leader for multilateralism. Success in Cuba could afford the international momentum and credibility to solve other seemingly “wicked problems” like the Middle East and Kashmir. President Obama could leverage this international reputation with other rogue nations like Iran and North Korea who might associate their plight with Cuba.35 The U.S. could begin to lead again and reverse its perceived decline in the greater global order bringing true peace for years to come.

Now is key – ideological shifts at home and potential development in Cuba

Partnership for the Americas Commission, 2008

[November 2008, the Partnership for the Americas Commission includes the following members: Ernesto Zedillo is the former President of Mexico and Commission co-chair of the Americas Commission for The Brookings Institution. Mauricio Cardenas is the Director of the Americas Commission for The Brookings Institution. Thomas R. Pickering Commission co-chair; Former U.S. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Leonardo Martinez-Diaz Deputy Director of the Commission; Political economy Fellow, Global economy and Development, Brookings Nancy Birdsall President; Center for Global Development Jonathan Coles; Former Minister of Agriculture of Venezuela Roberto Dañino; Former Prime Minister of Peru Jeffrey Davidow; President, institute of the Americas John Deutch; Former Deputy Secretary of Defense and Director, Central intelligence Agency Peter Hakim; President, inter-American Dialogue Alberto Ibargüen; President and Ceo, Knight Foundation Suzanne Nora Johnson; Senior Director and Former Vice Chairman, Goldman Sachs Celso Lafer; Former Foreign Minister of brazil Ricardo Lagos; Former President of Chile Carlos Ivan Simonsen Leal; President, Fundação Getulio Vargas, brazil Thomas “Mack” McLarty; Former U.S. envoy to the Americas Billie Miller; Former Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of barbados Moisés Naím; editor in Chief, Foreign Policy Magazine Jorge Quiroga; Former President of Bolivia Thomas Ramey; Chairman and President, Liberty international Eduardo Stein; Former Vice President of Guatemala Strobe Talbott; President, The Brookings Institution, “Rethink U.S.-Latin American Relations: A Hemispheric Partnership for a Turbulent World,” http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/Reports/2008/11/24%20latin%20america%20partnership/1124\_latin\_america\_partnership.PDF] Idriss

U.S.-Cuban relations have disproportionately dominated U.S. policy toward the LAC region for years. Tensions generated by U.S. policies toward Cuba have affected the United States’ image in the region and have hindered Washington’s ability to work constructively with other countries. For this reason, addressing U.S. policy toward Cuba has implications that go beyond the bilateral relationship and affect U.S. relations with the rest of the LAC region more generally. Political change in Washington, combined with recent demographic and ideological shifts in the Cuban American community and recent leadership changes in Cuba itself, offer a valuable opportunity to change course. Though the reforms enacted recently in Cuba have thus far been mostly cosmetic, they could create openings for grassroots political and economic activity. The removal of restrictions on access to tourist facilities and on the purchase of mobile telephones and computers may have an important psychological impact and increase contact with the outside world. Also, the Cuban government has recently lifted all wage caps, started to allow performance bonuses for certain salaried professions, liberalized the sale of farming equipment, and begun to lease idle state lands to increase agricultural output. These reforms may improve labor incentives, purchasing power, and productivity. Economic developments in Cuba will affect U.S.-Cuban relations. Today, the United States is Cuba’s fourth-largest trading partner; in 2007, it sold the island $582 million worth of goods (including shipping costs). Cuba is currently exploring its prospects for energy production in both sugarcane-based ethanol and off- shore oil. Spanish, Canadian, Norwegian, Brazilian, Indian, and other international oil companies have secured contracts to explore drilling possibilities off the Cuban coast. If the ethanol and oil industries become fully operational in five to seven years, revenues of $3 billion to $5 billion annually could significantly strengthen the Cuban economy and reduce the government’s vulnerability to external political pressure. With stable inflows of hard currency from oil sales, the Cuban government would have more funds to use at its discretion, further eroding the effects of the U.S. embargo on trade with Cuba.